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I. INTRODUCTION
The tax treatment of holders of security instruments in tax-free reor-
ganizations is inconsistent with public policy regarding the promotion of
long-term investments. Congress has repeatedly demonstrated a com-
mitment to encouraging long-term investment! The reorganization pro-
visions penalize holders of long-term investments and encourage invest-
ing in short-term instruments instead. The tax treatment of security in-
struments contravenes the underlying policy justifications for the reor-
ganization provisions, including encouraging long-term investment in
corporate enterprises.3 While public policy dictates that long-term in-
vestment in corporations is better than short-term investment, ultimately,
holders of debt instruments are in a more favorable tax position if their
investment is determined to be a short-term, non-security debt instru-
ment rather than a long-term security instrument.'
The Internal Revenue Code (the Code) provides that a taxpayer will
not recognize gain or loss if the taxpayer exchanges stock or securities in
one corporation for stock or securities in another corporation, as long as
the exchange is pursuant to a tax-free reorganization The term "tax-
free reorganization" leads taxpayers to believe that if a taxpayer ex-
changes stock or securities for different stock or securities in a new cor-
poration in connection with a tax-free reorganization, the taxpayer will
receive the new stock or securities tax free, without recognizing any gain
or loss.
A taxpayer's assumption that the transaction is tax free would be cor-
rect in most cases with regard to stock in a corporation if the exchange
2. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1(h), 1222 (2006) (providing for reduced capital gain rates for
property held for over one year and reduced dividend rates to encourage corporate in-
vestment).
3. See, e.g., §§ 1(h), 1222.
4. A debt instrument is defined as "any instrument or contractual arrangement that
constitutes indebtedness under general principles of Federal income tax law." See Treas.
Reg. § 1.1275-1(d) (as amended in 2002).




meets the other requirements of a tax-free reorganization.6 If, however, a
taxpayer holds a security instrument instead of stock, the taxpayer's as-
sumption that the exchange is tax free will probably not be correct. Al-
though the assumption that the exchange of security instruments is tax
free would be logical based on the implication from the initial wording of
the statute, to say that an exchange of security instruments in a tax-free
reorganization is tax free is only telling half of the story.7
In an exchange of security instruments pursuant to a tax-free reorgani-
zation, the tax treatment ends up being the worst scenario for the tax-
payer. The taxpayer will receive tax-free treatment when the taxpayer
would actually prefer taxable treatment, and the taxpayer will receive
taxable treatment when the taxpayer would actually prefer tax-free
treatment.8 An exchange of security instruments is tax free under the
reorganization provisions to the extent the taxpayer has a loss, and as a
result, a taxpayer cannot take a loss on an exchange of security instru-
ments in a tax-free reorganization.9 But, an exchange of security instru-
ments in a tax-free reorganization is fully taxable to the extent the tax-
payer has any gain.'0 For most taxpayers, being prevented from recogniz-
ing losses and being required to recognize gain is the most unfavorable
tax treatment possible." Alternatively, a taxpayer who exchanges stock
in a tax-free reorganization does not have to recognize any gain and is
also prevented from recognizing any loss on the exchange.
12
The conflicting tax treatment between stock and security instruments
can be justified on the basis that a security instrument is a type of debt
instrument, as opposed to stock, which is an equity interest; therefore,
security instruments are not entitled to the same tax treatment as stock.
As discussed below, however, there is not a sufficient justification for the
conflicting tax treatment between security instruments and other types of
debt instruments that do not qualify as security instruments. The tax
6. See § 354(a); see also §§ 356, 368. This discussion assumes that the debt-for-debt
exchanges are in connection with either a merger, reorganization, or financial restructuring
as the result of business motivations and not as a result of financial distress or insolvency.
There are specific reorganization provisions, specifically G reorganizations in section
368(a)(1)(G), that deal with bankrupt or insolvent corporations. See § 368(a)(1)(G). The
treatment of security instruments in these reorganizations, however, is beyond the scope of
this Article.
7. See infra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
8. See §§ 165(a), 166, 354(a), 356(c), (d)(2)(B).
9. See §§ 354(a), 356(c).
10. See §§ 354(a)(2),356(d)(2)(B).
11. There are, of course, unique tax positions for many taxpayers where triggering
gain immediately and deferring a loss might be the most advantageous tax treatment be-
cause of their particular circumstances.
12. See § 354.
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treatment of security instruments becomes inconsistent when comparing
different types of debt exchanges in tax-free reorganizations.
Non-security debt instruments receive better tax treatment from the
tax-free reorganization provisions than security instruments." Security
instruments are included in the tax-free reorganization provisions be-
cause they represent long-term, continuing interests in a corporation as
opposed to non-security debt instruments, which do not represent a true
continuing interest in the corporation. 4 Non-security debt holders are
not entitled to tax-free treatment under the reorganization provisions
because non-security debt instruments merely represent short-term notes
that are not intended for long-term investment and are more like a credi-
tor-type interest. 5 This explanation for the different tax treatment be-
tween the two types of instruments would be perfectly reasonable if the
tax treatment afforded to holders of security instruments truly was tax
free. However, because holders of security instruments are taxed on a
part of their gain, the characterization of security instruments as long-
term investments entitled them to be included in the tax-free reorganiza-
tion provisions, which conflicts with actual tax treatment of security in-
struments.
The tax treatment afforded to security instruments and non-security
debt instruments illustrates that the tax treatment is unequal and incon-
sistent. The tax consequences of an exchange of non-security debt in-
struments in a tax-free reorganization are much more favorable than the
tax consequences of holders of security instruments. Because non-
security debt instruments are not included in the tax-free reorganization
provisions, an exchange of non-security debt instruments is a fully taxable
event. 6 In a tax-free reorganization, holders of non-security debt instru-
ments are able to recognize any losses realized on an exchange of debt
13. A non-security debt instrument is essentially any debt instrument that is not classi-
fied as a security instrument for tax purposes. Determining what is classified as a security
instrument is not, however, an easy evaluation and is addressed in greater detail in Part
III.A of this Article.
14. See Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Comm'r, 287 U.S. 462, 468-69 (1933); Camp
Wolters Enters., Inc. v. Comm'r, 230 F.2d 555,559-60 (5th Cir. 1956); Burnham v. Comm'r,
86 F.2d 776, 777 (7th Cir. 1936); Cortland Specialty Co. v. Comm'r, 60 F.2d 937, 940 (2d
Cir. 1932).
15. See I.R.C. §§ 354(a)(1), 356(a)(1); see also Pinellas, 287 U.S. at 468-69; Camp
Wolters, 230 F.2d at 559-60; Burnham, 86 F.2d at 777; Cortland, 60 F.2d at 940. See gener-
ally Neville Coke & Chem. Co. v. Comm'r, 148 F.2d 599, 602 (3d Cir. 1945) (asking
whether "the notes ... give [the taxpayer] a 'proprietary' interest in the enterprise or
[whether it was] only a creditor" when determining if the notes were security instruments
or not).




instruments and are also required to recognize any gain. 17 This puts hold-
ers of non-security debt instruments in a more advantageous tax position
than holders of security instruments. Both security holders and non-
security holders have to recognize any gain on an exchange in a tax-free
reorganization, but only holders of non-security debt instruments are
allowed to recognize losses.
8
The difference between the tax treatment of holders of security instru-
ments and the tax treatment of holders of non-security instruments is
incompatible with good public policy. Providing more favorable tax con-
sequences to holders of non-security debt instruments in a tax-free reor-
ganization may discourage long-term investments in corporations and
instead encourage investing in shorter-term instruments.
The reorganization provisions in sections 354 and 368 of the Code pro-
vide that an exchange of stock or security instruments for new stock or
security instruments will be tax free if the other requirements of the stat-
ute are met.'9 The reorganization provisions in the Code benefit holders
of stock and penalize holders of long-term security instruments, while
allowing holders of non-security debt instruments fully taxable treat-
ment.20  Congress originally enacted the tax-free reorganization provi-
sions to avoid taxing profits that were purely on paper and to avoid inter-
fering with normal business adjustments.2' Presumably, stock and secu-
rity instruments were included in the reorganization provisions, while
other types of debt instruments were excluded because non-security debt
instruments were more akin to cash.2 Therefore, they should not be af-
17. See I.R.C. §§ 165(a), 166, 354(a), 356(a)(1), 1001(a). Section 354 would not apply
to an exchange of a non-security instrument for a non-security instrument and therefore,
the basic sale or exchange rules under section 1001 would apply. This assumes that no
other types of stock or security instruments of the debt holder were exchanged. If stock or
securities are also exchanged in connection with the non-security instruments, then losses
on any of the property held become precluded under section 356(c). See §§ 356(a)(1), (c),
1001(a).
18. See §§ 165(a), 166, 356(c). Assume, for example, that a taxpayer owns a security
instrument with an adjusted basis of $50 in Dell, Inc. Dell, Inc. and IBM decide to merge
and pursuant to a tax-free reorganization, the taxpayer receives a security instrument in
IBM worth $30 in exchange for his Dell, Inc. security instrument. The taxpayer has a $20
loss on the exchange of his security instruments. However, because he is exchanging secu-
rity instruments pursuant to a tax-free reorganization, he cannot recognize the loss. See §
354(a). If, however, the taxpayer owned a $50 non-security debt instrument in Dell, Inc.
instead of a security instrument, then he would be able to recognize a loss on the exchange.
See § 166.
19. See §§ 354(a)(1), 368.
20. See §§ 354(a)(1)-(2), 356(a), (c), 1001(c).
21. See H.R. REP. No. 73-704, at 9-10 (1934); S. REP. No. 65-617, at 5-6 (1918).
22. See Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Comm'r, 287 U.S. 462, 468-69 (1933); Camp
Wolters Enters., Inc. v. Comm'r, 230 F.2d 555, 559-60 (5th Cir. 1956); Neville Coke &
Chem. Co. v. Comm'r, 148 F.2d 599, 602 (3d Cir. 1945); Burnham v. Comm'r, 86 F.2d 776,
777 (7th Cir. 1936); Cortland Specialty Co. v. Comm'r, 60 F.2d 937, 940 (2d Cir. 1932).
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forded the same tax-free benefit that stock and security instruments are
afforded.
It appears that it was an attempt on the part of Congress to provide eq-
uity-type interests with tax-free treatment in an exchange and to provide
that an exchange of debt would be fully taxable. 23 As will be discussed in
greater detail later, this attempt to draw such a line between debt and
equity with security instruments failed because security instruments are a
type of debt, and trying to impose equity-like characteristics on these
instruments resulted in tax consequences that did not represent the true
24economics of the transaction.
The irony is that, although the definition of a security instrument is un-
clear, there is one overriding principle in the various interpretations of a
security instrument: a security instrument is a long-term debt instrument
that represents a continuing interest in the growth of the reorganizing
business, whereas a non-security debt instrument represents an invest-
ment that has little or no continuing interest in the corporation.2' This
type of long-term investment in a corporation is really a misnomer. In
reality, both non-security debt instruments and security instruments are
generally freely tradable; rarely does the motive of the investor ever ac-
tually represent an intention to invest with the corporation for a long
term.
Part II of this Article will provide a hypothetical that illustrates the in-
consistent tax treatment of security holders in a tax-free reorganization as
compared to holders of stock and holders of non-security debt instru-
ments. Following the hypothetical, Part III of this Article will discuss the
tax consequences of an exchange of security instruments and non-security
instruments in a tax-free reorganization, the policy reasons or justifica-
tions behind the reorganization provisions, and the possible justifications
for the disparate treatment of security holders. This discussion will in-
clude an examination of whether or not an interest that a taxpayer holds
is a security instrument, what the tax consequences are of the underlying
exchange to the holders of security instruments, and the tax conse-
quences to the corporation of the tax-free exchange. Once the tax conse-
quences of an exchange of security instruments in a tax-free reorganiza-
tion have been evaluated, Part IV of this Article will then discuss the tax
23. See S. REP. No. 65-617, at 5-6; see also Pinellas, 287 U.S. at 468-69.
24. The same type of confusion in drawing a line between debt and equity results
from non-qualified preferred stock, which is treated as equity with debt-like characteris-
tics. While it is beyond the scope of this Article, it is this author's position that non-
qualified preferred stock also provides for inconsistent and unequal tax consequences, and
rather than focusing on line drawing, the tax implications should depend on the actual
economics of the exchange.
25. See Camp Wolters, 230 F.2d at 559-60; Burnham, 86 F.2d at 776-77; Rev. Rul.
2004-78, 2004-31 I.R.B. 108, 108-09.
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consequences of a fully taxable exchange. Then, Part V of this Article
will examine the policy justifications and the legislative history behind
these provisions as well as current public policy and will suggest solutions
that are consistent with current public policy motivations. Finally, Part
VI of this Article will raise and then refute arguments in favor of retain-
ing the current tax provisions regarding security instruments.
The tax treatment of security instruments in tax-free reorganizations is
puzzling and inconsistent. A security instrument has been defined as a
long-term debt instrument, an interest that represents a continuing own-
ership interest in the corporation. Non-security debt instruments gener-
26ally represent a mere creditor's interest. Yet, when compared to the tax
consequences of an exchange of non-security debt instruments in a cor-
poration in connection with a tax-free reorganization an exchange of se-
27curity instruments has less favorable tax consequences.
II. HYPOTHETICAL
The following hypothetical is designed to illustrate the inconsistent and
contradictory tax treatment afforded to holders of security instruments
when compared to holders of stock or non-security debt instruments.
Assume, for example, that George owns stock in Vandalay Industries,
Inc. with an adjusted basis of $100 and a fair market value of $120, and
that Jerry owns a security instrument with a twenty-year term in Van-
dalay Industries, Inc. with a principal amount and an adjusted basis of
$100 and a fair market value equal to $120. 28 Vandalay Industries, Inc.
merges into Pendant Publishing, Inc. in a tax-free reorganization under
section 368. Pursuant to the reorganization, George exchanges his stock
in Vandalay Industries, Inc. for new stock in Pendant Publishing, Inc.
worth $120. Because the merger qualifies as a tax-free reorganization,
George recognizes no taxable gain on the exchange of his stocky.
Jerry, pursuant to the reorganization, also exchanges his security in-
strument in Vandalay Industries, Inc. for a new security instrument in
26. See Pinellas, 287 U.S. at 468-69; Camp Wolters, 230 F.2d at 559-60; Neville, 148
F.2d at 602; Burnham, 86 F.2d at 777; Cortland, 60 F.2d at 940.
27. See I.R.C. §§ 354(a), 356(d)(2), 1001(a) (2006).
28. A taxpayer's adjusted basis is generally the amount of capital he has invested in
property, which he will receive back on a sale or exchange free of gain. See §§ 1012,
1016(a)(1). In general, it represents the taxpayer's investment in the property and is the
measuring point for determining gain or loss. In this hypothetical, the taxpayer's adjusted
basis is equal to what the taxpayer paid for the property.
The fair market value of a debt instrument can depend on several factors, including the
financial stability and credit worthiness of the corporation, the interest rate on the debt
instrument, and the current market interest rate being offered on debt instruments. See,
e.g., Stephen B. Land, Defeating Deferral: A Proposal for Retrospective Taxation, 52 TAX
L. REv. 45, 62 (1996).
29. See I.R.C. §§ 354(a)(1), 368(a)(1).
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Pendant Publishing, Inc. with a principal amount and fair market value of
$120.30 Even though the fair market value of what Jerry is giving up in
the exchange is equal to the fair market value of what he is receiving,
Jerry must recognize $20 of gain because he holds a security instrument
and not stock.3'
At this point, the disparate treatment between the taxation of the ex-
change of George's stock versus Jerry's security instrument can be justi-
fied and rationalized because of the difference between an equity interest
and a debt interest. The different tax treatment between Jerry's security
interest and George's security interest is warranted once we must draw
the line between debt and equity-with stock on the equity side and the
security instrument on the debt side. Alternatively, we will see that to
justify the differences between security instruments and non-security debt
instruments, the line between debt and equity is drawn with non-security
instruments on the debt side of the line and security instruments on either
the equity side or the debt side of the line. This is the inconsistency.
Often, it appears inconsistent to security holders that the corporation in
which they hold a long-term investment enters into a tax-free reorganiza-
tion that generates only taxable gain and no recognizable loss to the secu-
rity holder. Yet, at the end of the day, these holders still hold a security
instrument in the corporation just as they had before. The security hold-
ers are taxed in spite of the fact that they have not cashed out their in-
vestment.
When the security instruments are exchanged for new security instru-
ments, as in the above example, Jerry's ownership interest in the corpora-
tion has changed. He now owns a security instrument with different
rights and risks. The change in his ownership interest justifies taxing the
exchange and treating the exchange as a taxable event. This is also con-
sistent with the tax treatment of an exchange of non-security debt in-
struments. The taxable treatment of an exchange of security instruments
based on the different rights and risks involved is not, however, consis-
tent with the tax-free treatment of stock in a tax-free reorganization.
This is because, often, stock received in such an exchange will have dif-
ferent rights and risks, and yet the exchange will still be tax free. For
example, if a new corporation issues security instruments or stock, both
the security holder and the stockholder now hold an investment in a cor-
30. The principal amount in this example is $120 for purposes of illustration. This
might happen if, for example, the security instrument Jerry gave up in the exchange had a
very high interest rate and a term that was coming due in the near future, and he received
a security instrument with a lower interest rate and an extended term.
31. See §§ 354(a)(2), 356(d)(2)(B). The gain is actually based on the fair market value
of the excess of the new principal amount over the original principal amount. For pur-
poses of this hypothetical, and to keep it simple, assume the fair market value of this excess
principal amount is equal to $20.
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poration with a different financial picture than the initial corporation in
which they invested. Perhaps the interest rate or the dividend amount
has changed as well. However, even though both stock and security in-
struments are included in the tax-free reorganization provisions, security
holders are taxed on the exchange and only the stockholders receive gain
tax free.32
This is not to say that taxing security holders on an exchange of security
instruments is inappropriate. Rather, this example is meant to illustrate
that inclusion of security instruments in the tax-free reorganization provi-
sions appears to be inappropriate.
The inconsistent tax treatment of a holder of security instruments is
further illustrated by comparing Jerry's tax treatment to the tax treat-
ment of a holder of a non-security debt instrument in a loss scenario.
Assume, for example, that Jerry holds a twenty-year security instrument
in Vandalay Industries, Inc. with a principal amount and adjusted basis of
$100 and a fair market value of $80. Assume further that Elaine owns a
non-security debt instrument with a term of six months in Vandalay In-
dustries, Inc. with a principal amount and adjusted basis of $100 and a
fair market value of $80."3 Vandalay Industries, Inc. merges into Pendant
Publishing, Inc. in a merger that qualifies as a tax-free reorganization.
Jerry receives a twenty-year security instrument in Pendant Publishing,
Inc. with a principal amount and a fair market value of $80. He has a $20
loss but is prevented from recognizing the loss because the exchange
qualifies as a tax-free reorganization. 34 Elaine exchanges her six-month
debt instrument in Vandalay Industries, Inc. for a debt instrument with a
six-month term in Pendant Publishing, Inc. with a principal amount and a
fair market value of $80.35 Elaine recognizes her $20 loss because she
does not hold a security instrument and therefore is not subject to the
tax-free reorganization provisions.36
Thus, Jerry, who holds a long-term interest in Vandalay Industries,
Inc., which meets the criteria to be classified as a "security instrument,"
must recognize any potential gain on the exchange, but cannot recognize
32. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
33. As will be discussed in greater detail in Part III.C of this Article, Elaine's gain or
loss would actually be based on the issue price of her debt instrument rather than the
debt's principal amount. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(g)(1) (as amended in 1996). To sim-
plify the hypothetical, it is assumed for purposes of this example that Elaine's principal
amount and issue price both equal $100.
34. See I.R.C. § 356(c).
35. Again, for simplification purposes, it is assumed that the issue price of the debt
instrument that Elaine receives is also equal to $80. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(g)(1).
36. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. Note, however, that if Elaine held, in
addition to her non-security debt instrument, any stock or additional security instruments
in Vandalay Industries, Inc. that were also exchanged in the reorganization, she would be
prevented from recognizing the loss as well. See I.R.C. § 356(c).
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any potential loss in a tax-free reorganization." Alternatively, if Jerry
held a short-term debt instrument that did not qualify as a security in-
strument, he would have to recognize gain but would also be able to rec-• 38
ognize any loss.
There appears to be no justification for the inconsistent and inequitable
treatment to holders of security instruments versus holders of other in-
vestments in corporations. The House of Representatives stated that it
was concerned that security holders might take advantage of the reor-
ganization provisions;39 however, there is no explanation for why Con-
gress chose to allow non-security holders fully taxable treatment that
often results in more favorable tax treatment. Congress enacted the re-
organization provisions over eighty years ago based on the policy motiva-
tions relevant at that time.4 It is unclear whether these provisions are
consistent with current public policy and economic conditions.
III. THE TAX TREATMENT OF EXCHANGES OF SECURITIES IN TAX-FREE
REORGANIZATIONS
A. Definition of Securities
The first determination that a taxpayer holding a debt instrument must
make in order to establish his tax treatment in a tax-free exchange is
whether the taxpayer owns a security instrument or a non-security debt
instrument. The term "security instrument" has been debated by courts
for over seventy years and still has never been clearly defined.4' Some of
the possible ownership interests that a taxpayer may hold in a corpora-
tion include stock, a security instrument, or a non-security debt instru-
ment. Many labels and titles given to ownership interests in a corpora-
tion do not necessarily correspond to the underlying nature of the inter-
est. Often, the label given to an ownership interest is an attempt to sim-
37. See § 356(a)(1)-(2), (c), (d)(2).
38. See §§ 61(a), 165(a), 166, 1001(a).
39. See H.R. REP. No. 73-704, at 8-9 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 67-350, at 11-12 (1921).
40. See S. REP. No. 65-617, at 5 (1918).
41. See Helvering v. Watts, 296 U.S. 387, 389 (1935); Comm'r v. Neustadt's Trust, 131
F.2d 528, 529 (2d Cir. 1942) (stating that the term "securities" should be given its ordinary,
plain meaning); Lagerquist v. Comm'r, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 530, 534-35 (1987) (stating that
the key factor is the amount of risk a debt holder takes). The definition of a security is
used throughout the Code; however, the definitions differ depending on the code section.
See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 165(g)(2), 166. The definition of security instruments under section 351
has been applied to define security instruments under sections 354 and 368. See Rev. Rul.
59-98, 1959-1 C.B. 76, 76-77. Under section 165(g)(2), debt securities may be of any term
but must be issued by a corporation or a government and must either be in registered form
or have interest coupons. See I.R.C. § 165(g)(2).
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42ply generate the desired tax consequences. 2 It would be a simple answer
if the label given to an interest in a corporation could be trusted to reflect
the true economic ownership interest in the corporation. However, as
reflected by years of case law, taxpayers must look to the underlying
property, the economic interests, and the attributes of the property to
determine if an interest in a corporation is equity (such as stock) or
debt.43 Even when a taxpayer can confidently say that he owns a debt
instrument rather than an equity interest in a corporation, the issue is
further complicated by the confusion surrounding whether that debt in-
strument is a security instrument or a non-security debt instrument.
42. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) will not respect a label given if the underlying
transaction does not correspond to the label. Rather, the IRS will recharacterize the trans-
action to fit with its appropriate label. This is known as the "substance over form doc-
trine." See, e.g., Joseph Isenberg, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. CHI.
L. REV. 859, 879 (1982); Lewis R. Steinberg, Form, Substance and Directionality in Sub-
chapter C, 52 TAX LAW. 457,457 (1999).
43. One could write several articles alone on the classification of debt versus equity.
See generally BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 91 4.02 (6th ed. 2000); Anthony P. Polito, Useful
Fictions: Debt and Equity Classification in Corporate Tax Law, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 761
(1998). Because it is an undertaking beyond the scope of this Article, it will not be ad-
dressed here.
Nonqualified preferred stock is an interesting example of another type of ownership
interest that falls between debt and equity. Nonqualified preferred stock is often referred
to as "debt-like preferred stock" because its attributes are so similar to debt. See Sympo-
sium, The Future of Tax Law in the Face of Globalization: Practical and Policy Considera-
tions, 13 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 35, 67 (1998). A right to acquire nonqualified
preferred stock received in exchange for stock, other than nonqualified preferred stock,
will not be treated as a security instrument. See I.R.C. § 351(g)(1). If, however, nonquali-
fied preferred stock is exchanged for nonqualified preferred stock (or rights to nonquali-
fied preferred stock for rights to nonqualified preferred stock) the exchange will qualify
for tax-free treatment under section 354. The Treasury Regulations under section 356
provide that as long as the nonqualified preferred stock received in the exchange is "sub-
stantially identical" to the nonqualified preferred stock given up, the resulting exchange is
tax free. See Treas. Reg. § 1.356-7(b)(1) (as amended in 2000). Nonqualified preferred
stock is considered substantially identical to new nonqualified preferred stock if its terms
are similar to the terms of the original nonqualified preferred stock and the potential of
exercising the right or obligation attached to the stock "does not become more likely than
not to occur within a 20-year period" by reason of the exchange (as of the date of the
original issuance of the stock). § 1.356-7(b)(2). The new nonqualified preferred stock
cannot "decrease the period in which a right or obligation... can be exercised, or increase
the likelihood that such a right or obligation will be exercised, or accelerate the timing of
the returns from the stock instrument, including.., dividends or other distributions." Id.
In addition to coming up with a bright line test for determining whether a debt instrument
was a security instrument or not, one truly murky area of this issue was whether options,
warrants, and stock rights were securities. This issue was clarified for taxpayers by the
Treasury Regulations. In 1998, the Treasury issued final regulations that stated that rights
to acquire stock pursuant to certain tax-free reorganizations and divisions were securities
with zero principal amounts. §§ 1.354-1(e) (as amended in 2000), 1.355-1(c) (as amended
in 2000), 1.356-3(b) (as amended in 2000).
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Security instruments represent a type of investment in a corporation
that is not quite an equity interest but has more ownership attributes in
the corporation than a non-security debt instrument.4 4 A holder of a se-
curity instrument will generally have more of an interest and participa-
tion in the long-term growth of a corporation than the holder of a short-
term debt instrument characterized as a non-security debt instrument, but
not as much participation as a holder of stock.45 Although a security in-
strument clearly represents a debt interest and not an equity interest, the
holder of a security instrument has more of a continuing interest in the
corporation than a holder of a non-security debt instrument.46 It is essen-
tially a superior ownership interest to that of a non-security debt instru-
ment.47 Because of this heightened ownership interest, security instru-
ments are included in the tax-free reorganization provisions.
48
There is no easy, bright line rule to determine if a debt instrument is a
security instrument. The term security instrument is not defined in the
reorganization provisions. Instead, the determination must be made
based on the facts and circumstances surrounding the debt instrument.
49
The factors a taxpayer would use to evaluate whether a debt instrument
is a security instrument include the length of the term of the note, the
continuing interest in the business represented by the note, and the de-
gree of the holder's participation in a corporation.5 ° Many courts have
attempted to simplify the determination by creating and applying a bright
line, length of time test based on the term of the note.5 Such a test, how-
ever, has proven to be insufficient because the other terms of the debt
instrument may or may not be consistent with a security instrument and
the continuing interest requirement imposed on a security holder. 2
44. See Camp Wolters Enters., Inc. v. Comm'r, 230 F.2d 555,560 (5th Cir. 1956) ("It is
not necessary for the debt obligation to be the equivalent of stock since Sec. 112(b)(5)
specifically includes both 'stock' and 'securities."').
45. See id.
46. See id. The Treasury Regulations specifically provide that "a short-term purchase
money note is not a security." Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (as amended in 2005).
47. See Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Comm'r, 287 U.S. 462,469-70 (1933); Camp
Wolters, 230 F.2d at 560.
48. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
49. See Camp Wolters, 230 F.2d at 560.
50. See id.
51. See Pinellas, 287 U.S. at 469 (holding that short-term notes payable within four
months were not securities); Neville Coke & Chem. Co. v. Comm'r, 148 F.2d 599, 602-03
(3d Cir. 1945) (holding that three-, four-, and five-year notes were not securities); Lloyd-
Smith v. Comm'r, 116 F.2d 642, 643 (2d Cir. 1941) (holding that two-year notes were not
securities); see also BITrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 43, 12.41[3].
52. See Camp Wolters, 230 F.2d at 560 (approving the Tax Court's decision that "'[t]he
test as to whether notes are securities is not a mechanical determination of the time period
of the note. Though time is an important factor, the controlling consideration is an overall
evaluation of the nature of the debt, degree of participation and continuing interest in the
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In addition, Revenue Ruling 2004-78 dismissed any possibility of a
clear-cut time test by holding that a relatively short-term debt instrument
was in fact a security instrument because of the nature of the instru-
ment.53 Determining whether a debt instrument is a security instrument
or a non-security debt instrument is integral to resolving whether a tax-
payer will qualify for tax-free treatment under the reorganization provi-
sions. Defining the term security, however, has become increasingly
complicated and imprecise because of the lack of an obvious rule.54
Courts have hinged the determination in the tax-free reorganization
context of whether a debt instrument is a security instrument or a non-
security debt instrument ultimately on whether the holder has a continu-
ing interest in the corporation.5 By requiring that the security holder
manifest a continuing interest in the corporation, courts have created a
type of hybrid ownership interest that falls between an equity interest
and a debt interest. To qualify as a security instrument, a debt instru-
ment must represent a long-term ownership interest in the corporation
that reflects a continuing proprietary interest.
5 6
The continuity of interest requirement for security instruments was de-
rived from the Supreme Court test in Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v.
business"'); see also Rev. Rul. 2004-78, 2004-31 I.R.B. 108, 109 (holding that a two-year
debt instrument qualified as a security instrument).
53. See Rev. Rul. 2004-78, 2004-31 I.R.B. 108, 109.
54. See Pinellas, 287 U.S. at 467; Camp Wolters, 230 F.2d at 560; Scofield v. LeTulle,
103 F.2d 20, 21-22 (5th Cir. 1939); Comm'r v. Freund, 98 F.2d 201, 204-05 (3d Cir. 1938);
Burnham v. Comm'r, 86 F.2d 776, 776-77; Lilienthal v. Comm'r, 80 F.2d 411, 412-13 (9th
Cir. 1935); Cortland Specialty Co. v. Comm'r, 60 F.2d 937, 940 (2d Cir. 1932).
55. See Pinellas, 287 U.S. at 470; Freund, 98 F.2d at 205; Cortland, 60 F.2d at 940.
Interestingly, when the court lays out what might be considered a security, it cites some
traits of an equity interest instead of a debt instrument. See, e.g., Pinellas, 287 U.S. at 470.
This confusion pervades much of the law in determining what a security instrument is.
While this paper will not examine the debt/equity distinction as it is an equally unclear
topic, it is interesting how that confusion pervades the attempt to define securities. See id.
But see Erwin N. Griswold, "Securities" and "Continuity of Interest," 58 HARV. L. REV.
705, 719-25 (1945) (contending that courts following Pinellas, in particular Neville Coke &
Chemical Co. v. Comm'r, 148 F.2d 599 (1945), incorrectly applied the continuity of interest
requirement to security instruments, further complicating the determination unnecessar-
ily).
56. See LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415, 420-21 (1940) (noting particularly that the
term of the debt instruments was immaterial); United States v. Hertwig, 398 F.2d 452, 455
(5th Cir. 1968); Camp Wolters, 230 F.2d at 560; Bedford v. Comm'r, 150 F.2d 341, 343 (2d
Cir. 1945); Skenandoa Rayon Corp. v. Comm'r, 122 F.2d 268, 270 (2d Cir. 1941) (stating
that dividend rights represented enough of a continuing interest in the corporation to con-
stitute securities); L. & E. Stirn, Inc. v. Comm'r, 107 F.2d 390, 392 (2d Cir. 1939); Brown v.
Comm'r, 27 T.C. 27, 36 (1956); Wellington Fund, Inc. v. Comm'r, 4 T.C. 185, 189 (1944)
(holding that securities must represent participation in the business and not temporary
advances to the corporation meant to meet current corporate needs).
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Commissioner." In Pinellas, the Supreme Court adopted a continuity of
interest requirement for corporate reorganizations as was first laid out by
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Cortland Specialty Co. v.
Commissioner." The continuity of interest requirement as applied to
stockholders provides that the stockholders of the target corporation
must have a continuing interest in the surviving corporation for a reor-
ganization to qualify as tax free.5 9 The continuity of interest requirement
ensures that the intent of the stockholders is to preserve their ownership
interest in the corporation rather than cashing out their investments
through a tax-free reorganization. 60
The Supreme Court in Pinellas decided two separate issues: (1)
whether the reorganization was tax free based on whether the stockhold-
ers met the continuity of interest requirement; and (2) whether the debt
instruments in the reorganization constituted security instruments.6' Fu-
ture courts, in interpreting the Pinellas case, commingled the two issues
rather than interpreting the two issues separately as the Supreme Court
handled them in its holding.62 Courts following the Pinellas case held that
in order to qualify as a security instrument, the holders of security in-
struments had to demonstrate a continuing interest in the corporation
even though the holders of security instruments did not own an equity
interest.6' It is not clear from the Supreme Court's holding in Pinellas
that this is what the Supreme Court intended.64
In Pinellas, the Supreme Court's discussion regarding whether the debt
instruments were security instruments was therefore moot and an exer-
57. Pinellas, 287 U.S. at 470; see also Griswold, supra note 55, at 708; Comment, Sec-
tion 351 Transfers to Controlled Corporations: The Forgotten Term-"Securities," 114 U.
PA. L. REV. 314, 319-20 (1965).
58. Pinellas, 287 U.S. at 470 (holding that the debt instruments were not security in-
struments because the holders of the debt instruments intended to sell their investment
and cash out their investment rather than maintain a continuing interest); Cortland, 60
F.2d at 939-40.
59. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e) (as amended in 2005).
60. See § 1.368-1(e)(i).
61. Pinellas, 287 U.S. at 469-70; see also Griswold, supra note 55, at 707.
62. See Griswold, supra note 55, at 708-09, 718-25.
63. See Neville Coke & Chem. Co. v. Comm'r, 148 F.2d 599, 601-02 (3d Cir. 1945);
Wellington Fund, Inc. v. Comm'r, 4 T.C. 185, 189 (1944); Rev. Rul. 59-98, 1959-1 C.B. 76,
77.
64. Pinellas, 287 U.S. at 469-70. In Cortland, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit stated that "[t]he word 'securities' was used so as not to defeat the exemption in
cases where the interest of the transferor was carried over to the new corporation in some
form." Cortland Specialty Co. v. Comm'r, 60 F.2d 937, 940 (2d Cir. 1932). If the Second
Circuit is correct, and the intent of Congress behind including securities in the reorganiza-
tion provisions was to ensure that as long as a holder is maintaining the same interest in
the acquiring corporation that holder should have no gain or loss, then one cannot recon-




cise in academic discourse. Later courts in interpreting the Pinellas case
combined the two issues and imposed the continuity of interest require-
ment on security holders.6 The court in Burnham v. Commissioner6
stated, "[it is obvious that both Courts [in the Pinellas and Cortland
holdings] based their decisions not so much on the ground that the short-
term purchase money notes were not securities as that the transactions
involved were not reorganizations." 67 The determination of whether the
debt instruments were security instruments in the Pinellas and Cortland
cases was actually irrelevant; the reorganizations did not qualify as tax
free because the stockholders had not met the continuity of interest re-
quirement irrespective of whether the instruments were security instru-
ments.68
When the holder of a security instrument exchanges his debt instru-
ment in the target corporation for an interest in the acquiring corporation
that has identical rights to the debt instrument exchanged, the holder is
continuing and maintaining an identical interest in the corporation. Al-
though an identical interest is being maintained in the corporation, the
tax consequences to the holder hinges on whether that interest is classi-
fied as a security instrument.
Courts have used several factors to determine whether a debt instru-
ment represented a sufficient continuing interest to be classified as a se-
curity instrument. The most frequently cited factor for determining the
continuing interest of a holder of a debt instrument was a "time test."
69
The time test based the determination of whether or not a debt instru-
ment was a security instrument on the length of the term of the debt in-
70strument. In general, if a debt instrument had a term of more than ten
65. See Griswold, supra note 55, at 708-09, 718-25.
66. 86 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1936).
67. Id. at 776,777.
68. Pinellas, 287 U.S. at 468-69; Cortland, 60 F.2d at 940.
69. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
70. See Comm'r v. Tyng, 106 F.2d 55, 58-59 (2d Cir. 1939), rev'd sub nom. Helvering v.
Tyng, 308 U.S. 527 (1940) (holding that twenty- and forty-year unsecured bonds were
securities because they represented a long-term investment on the part of the transferor).
The Second Circuit also dismissed the Commissioner's contention that whether or not a
debt instrument was secured or unsecured was not the critical determination, but rather
the length of the investment was the critical determination. Id. at 59; see also Neville Coke
& Chem. Co. v. Comm'r, 148 F.2d 599, 602-03 (3d Cir. 1945) (holding that three-, four-,
and five-year notes were not securities and even though the creditors sat on the board of
directors and they did not have a sufficient proprietary interest in the corporation-but the
court noted that time was not the determining factor); L. & E. Stirn, Inc. v. Comm'r, 107
F.2d 390, 392 (2d Cir. 1939); Comment, supra note 57, at 320-21. But see LeTulle v.
Scofield, 308 U.S. 415, 420 (1940) (noting particularly that the term of the debt instruments
was immaterial).
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years, it was classified as a security instrument.71 If a debt instrument had
a term of less than five years, it was not a security instrument; rather, it
was a regular debt instrument.72 If a debt instrument had a term greater
than five years and less than ten years, whether or not the instrument was
a security instrument became a question of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the debt instrument.73
Revenue Ruling 2004-78 dismissed the possibility of using a time test as
a bright line rule to determine if a debt instrument was a security instru-
ment.7 4 In Revenue Ruling 2004-78, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
ruled that a two-year debt instrument in the acquiring corporation was a
security instrument, and therefore the holder was entitled to tax-free
treatment on the exchange of his security instrument.75 The IRS ruled
that the two-year debt instrument could be considered a security instru-
ment, even though, taken alone, a new debt instrument with a two-year
term would generally not represent a continuing interest in the corpora-
tion sufficient to qualify the debt instrument as a security instrument.
76
The IRS reasoned that because the debt instrument received in the ex-
change had a two-year term that corresponded to the two-year term re-
71. See Burnham, 86 F.2d at 776; Dennis v. Comm'r, 57 T.C. 352, 361-62 (1971) (hold-
ing that a debt instrument with a 12.5-year term was a security instrument); Nye v.
Comm'r, 50 T.C. 203, 212 (1968) ("Basic to this settled rule [that promissory notes can be
security instruments], is a requirement that the notes have a sufficiently long term to ac-
cord them an investment quality rather than the characteristics of cash. The latter. charac-
teristics may disqualify short-term notes as securities." (footnote omitted)); see also Wolf
Envelope Co. v. Comm'r, 17 T.C. 471, 480 (1951); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 6605266400A
(May 26, 1966); KEVIN M. KEYES, FEDERAL TAXATION OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS
AND TRANSACTIONS I 3.05[2][b][i] (1997).
72. See Comm'r v. Sisto Fin. Corp., 139 F.2d 253, 254, 256 (2d Cir. 1943); L. & E.
Stirn, 107 F.2d at 392; Worcester Salt Co. v. Comm'r, 75 F.2d 251, 252 (2d Cir. 1935); see
also Rev. Rul. 2004-78, 2004-31 I.R.B. 108, 109; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8025081 (March 26,
1980); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7928003 (March 23, 1979); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem.
6605266400A; KEYES, supra note 71, 3.05[2][b][i].
73. See Camp Wolters Enters., Inc. v. Comm'r, 230 F.2d 555, 560 (5th Cir. 1956) (af-
firming the Tax Court's holding that five- to nine-year notes are securities); Neville, 148
F.2d at 601-02 (holding that the term was not the determining factor and that the proprie-
tary interest of the creditor should be the determining factor); Comm'r v. Freund, 98 F.2d
201, 203-06 (3d Cir. 1938); Brown v. Comm'r, 27 T.C. 27, 36 (1956) (stating that the length
of time is not the only consideration, but rather an overall evaluation of whether the debt
instrument evidences a continuing interest); Pan Am. Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 4 T.C.M.
(CCH) 555 (1945); Rev. Rul. 59-98, 1959-1 C.B. 76, 76-77; Comment, supra note 57, at 320;
see also I.R.S. Field Service Advisory, Sept. 22, 1993, 1993 WL 1469500 ("There is no
bright line with respect to the minimum term required in order to classify a debt instru-
ment as a security. The Service will generally not consider a debt instrument with a term
of less than 10 years as a security."); BITrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 43, 12.41[3];
KEYES, supra note 71, 1 3.05[2][b][i].
74. See Rev. Rul. 2004-78, 2004-31 I.R.B. 108, 108-09.




maining on the security instrument given up in the exchange, the new
debt instrument could also be classified as a security instrument.
77
The reorganization provisions require that for tax-free treatment in the
case of an exchange of security instruments, one security instrument must
be exchanged for another security instrument.78 There is a certain logic
behind the IRS' decision in Revenue Ruling 2004-78 because the debt
instrument that the taxpayer gave up in the exchange had the same re-
maining term in the corporation as the debt instrument that the taxpayer
received, and therefore, what the taxpayer received was similar to what
the taxpayer gave up. Congress, however, did not draft section 354 to
provide that an exchange of similar instruments would be entitled to tax-
free treatment. Exchanges of debt instruments are not entitled to tax-
free treatment just because the terms of the debt instruments received
mirror the terms of the debt instruments given up in the exchange.79
Rather, Congress required that a security instrument be received in ex-
change for giving up a security instrument.80 Therefore, as the statute
makes clear, the debt instrument received in the exchange must qualify as
a security instrument independent of the instrument given up in the ex-
change.8'
The IRS has acknowledged that a two-year debt instrument is generally
insufficient to constitute a security instrument. However, the IRS still
ruled that a two-year debt instrument qualifies as a security instrument if
the terms of the debt instrument are sufficiently similar to the surren-
dered security instrument.8 This ruling, therefore, implies that the test
for a security instrument must only be made for one debt instrument,
provided that the debt instrument received in the exchange is similar
enough to the security instrument given up at the time of the exchange.
77. See id.
78. See I.R.C. § 354(a) (2006).
79. Ironically, this is precisely what section 1001 of the Code and the debt modifica-
tion rules in Treasury Regulation section 1.1001-3 provide in the case of an exchange of a
non-security debt instrument (or an exchange of debt instruments outside of a reorganiza-
tion context). See discussion infra Part IV.B. It should be noted, however, that even if this
was the rule that Congress had intended, the exchange in Revenue Ruling 2004-78 still
would not have qualified as a tax-free exchange because, as reflected in the Revenue Rul-
ing, the terms of the two debt instruments were sufficiently different that they would have
constituted a significant modification and therefore a sale or exchange under section 1001.
See Rev. Rul. 2004-78, 2004-31 I.R.B. 108, 108-09; see also I.R.C. § 1001(a); Treas. Reg. §
1.1001-3(b) (as amended in 1996).
80. See I.R.C. § 354(a).
81. See id.
82. See Rev. Rul. 2004-78,2004-31 I.R.B. 108, 109.
83. Id. Note that the terms were different enough that, as acknowledged by the IRS,
the exchange would have qualified as a significant modification under section 1001 and
would have otherwise have constituted a sale or exchange. See id. at 108.
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Perhaps requiring only one side of the exchanged debt instruments to
qualify as a security instrument makes sense. This approach is logical
because what the taxpayer is giving up in the exchange is so similar to
what the taxpayer is receiving. Although this approach is logical, this
approach does not address the requirements of the statute-that one se-
curity instrument is exchanged for another. In addition, because a debt
instrument with a relatively short term can be classified as a security in-
strument, there is no longer a reliable bright line time test.
Revenue Ruling 2004-78 erodes the definition of a security instrument.
By diminishing the standard for the determination of a security instru-
ment to a very low threshold test, essentially any debt instrument could
fall within the reorganization provisions. This will, in turn, further pre-
vent the recognition of losses and require the recognition of gain. Had
Congress intended the term security instrument to be so inclusive, it
would have stated that an exchange of "stock or any debt instrument"
will be entitled to tax-free treatment so long as the interests being ex-
changed were substantially identical rather than limiting the favorable
treatment to an exchange of "stock or securities." 4
There is no clear answer for many debt holders trying to determine
what type of instrument they own. Although applying a continuity of
interest standard to determine if an interest was a security instrument
may have been inappropriate, it became critical to the classification of a
security instrument.5 The leading factor to demonstrate a continuing
interest in a corporation by a debt holder was the length of the term of
the debt instrument. 6 A holder cannot rely on a time test, however, after
Revenue Ruling 2004-78, and must instead consider other factors. The
test for a security instrument is not a mechanical "time-test," but rather is
based on all of the factors surrounding the note, such as the term of the
note, the "degree of participation and continuing interest in the busi-
ness," the purpose of the note, the risk taken by the debt holders, and
similar considerations.88 In addition, if a security instrument is given up
in the exchange, the debt instrument received may be deemed to be a
security instrument if its terms are similar enough to the exchanged secu-
84. See I.R.C. § 354(a).
85. See LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415, 420-21 (1940); United States v. Hertwig, 398
F.2d 452, 455 (5th Cir. 1968); Camp Wolters Enters., Inc. v. Comm'r, 230 F.2d 555, 560 (5th
Cir. 1956); Bedford v. Comm'r, 150 F.2d 341, 343 (2d Cir. 1945); L. & E. Stirn, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 107 F.2d 390, 392 (2d Cir. 1939); Wellington Fund, Inc. v. Comm'r, 4 T.C. 185,
189 (1944).
86. See Comm'r v. Tyng, 106 F.2d 55, 58-59 (2d Cir. 1939), rev'd sub nom. Helvering v.
Tyng, 308 U.S. 527 (1940); Dennis v. Comm'r, 57 T.C. 352, 361-62 (1971); Nye v. Comm'r,
50 T.C. 203, 212 (1968); Wolf Envelope Co. v. Comm'r, 17 T.C. 471, 480 (1951); I.R.S.
Tech. Adv. Mem. 6605266400A (May 26, 1966).
87. See Rev. Rul. 2004-78,2004-31 I.R.B. 108, 109.
88. See Camp Wolters, 230 F.2d at 560.
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rity instrument even if the debt instrument would not have independently
qualified as a security instrument.8 9
B. Treatment of Debt-for-Debt Exchanges in a Tax-Free Reorganization
In a tax-free reorganization, stockholders can exchange stock in the
target corporation for stock in the acquiring corporation without tax con-9O
sequences. The general rule is that a taxpayer will not recognize gain or
loss on an exchange of stock or securities from one corporation that is a
party to a reorganization, for stock or securities in either the same corpo-
ration or in another corporation that is also a party to a reorganization.91
The reorganization provisions, which provide for a tax-free exchange of
stock or securities, were enacted to ensure that transactions that were
merely on paper would not have tax consequences to the taxpayer. 92
Congress did not want to interfere with business adjustments or tax indi-
viduals on "technical gain" that they might have when, in fact, they real-
ized no cash profit.93 Once taxpayers eventually converted their owner-
ship interests in the corporation into cash, they would have to pay tax on
the inherent gain. Until the taxpayers "cashed out" their investment,
though, Congress thought the taxpayer should not have to pay tax on the
gain.94
Prior to the enactment of the tax-free reorganization provisions, the tax
treatment of an exchange of property, including security instruments, was
to treat the exchange as a taxable sale or exchange with the fair market
value of the property received considered the equivalent of cash.95 As a
result, the taxpayer would recognize gain or loss on the exchange.96 Con-
gress changed the tax consequences to taxpayers of an exchange of stock
and securities in the context of a tax-free reorganization and provided
instead that an exchange of stock or securities would be tax free until the
stock or securities in the reorganized corporations were ultimately sold
89. See Rev. Rul. 2004-78, 2004-31 I.R.B. 108, 109.
90. See §§ 354(a), 368.
91. See § 354(a)(1).
92. See S. REP. NO. 65-617, at 5-6 (1918). Since 1918, the distinction for recognizing
gain in the case of security instruments was for security instruments with a "par value" or
face value higher than the par value or face value security instrument given up in the ex-
change. See H.R. REP. No. 65-1037, at 44-45 (1919) (Conf. Rep.). For a thorough discus-
sion of the legislative history behind the reorganization provisions, as well as a critique of
the current taxing structure of reorganizations, see Yariv Brauner, A Good Old Habit, or
Just an Old One? Preferential Tax Treatment for Reorganizations, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1,
52-68 (2004).
93. See S. REP. No. 67-275, at 11 (1921).
94. See id. at 11-12; S. REP. NO. 65-617, at 5-6 (1918).
95. See H.R. REP. No. 65-1037, at 44-45; S. REP. No. 65-617, at 5-6.
96. See H.R. REP. NO. 65-1037, at 44-45; S. REP. No. 65-617, at 5-6.
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and the taxpayer had "cashed out."' Congress determined that it was
necessary to enact this amendment because "no part of the present in-
come tax law has been productive of so much uncertainty or has more
seriously interfered with necessary business readjustments."98 Congress
also stated that taxing such exchanges was "economically unsound." 99
Section 354(a)(1) provides that an exchange of security instruments will
be tax free to a taxpayer if the exchange takes place pursuant to a tax-
free reorganization.'0 This tax-free treatment is limited, however, and
non-recognition treatment of taxable gain will not apply, if the principal
amount of the security instrument received exceeds the principal amount
of a security instrument surrendered.' 1 The principal amount of a debt
instrument is generally equal to the debt instrument's face amount, which
is equal to the amount of principal payments that will be made on a debt
instrument through maturity.'°
Congress wanted to avoid taxing purely paper transactions, such as an
exchange of security instruments in a tax-free reorganization, and to en-
courage businesses to restructure when necessary.'°3 Through amend-
ments to the reorganization provisions, however, Congress has slowly
eroded away at the tax-free treatment afforded to security instruments
and has begun to tax gains on these exchanges while preventing losses.
During the Great Depression, a proposal to fully tax reorganizations
was dismissed. It became clear that Congress was more concerned with
preventing taxpayers from taking losses than either allowing businesses
to restructure without the fear of tax consequences or taxing taxpayers
purely on paper gains.05 Rather, as the legislative history indicates, Con-
gress was concerned not with what the proper or correct tax treatment to
tax-free exchanges was, but rather with the revenue loss that making
97. See H.R. REP. No. 73-704, at 13 (1934); S. REP. No. 67-275, at 11-12; H.R. REP.
NO. 65-1037, at 44-45; S. REP. No. 65-617, at 5-6.
98. S. REP. No.67-275,at 11.
99. Id. The discussion of the amendment in 1921 to section 202(c) concerned not only
the reorganization provision, but also the provision enacting like-kind exchanges. See id.
Exchanges of property of a like kind are not subject to recognition of gain or loss if prop-
erty is "held for productive use in a trade or business or for investment." I.R.C. § 1031
(2006).
100. § 354(a)(1).
101. See § 354(a)(2)(A). Stock rights are classified as securities with zero principal
amount. See Treas. Reg. § 1.354-1(e) (as amended in 2000).
102. See H.R. REP. No. 65-1037, at 44-45 (referring to the face amount of the debt).
The principal of a debt instrument is the portion of the debt that is not interest. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1231 (8th ed. 2004).
103. See S. REP. NO. 67-275, at 11-12; S. REP. No. 65-617, at 5-6 (1918).
104. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 39-41 (1954), reprinted in 1954
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4221.
105. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-704, at 12-13 (1934); S. REP. No. 67-275, at 11-12; S. REP.
NO. 65-617, at 5-6.
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these exchanges taxable would cause.1°6 Although the economic climate
has changed dramatically since that debate, the inclusion of securities in
the tax-free reorganization provisions has not.
Even though security instruments are initially included in tax-free reor-
ganization provisions pursuant to the language in section 354(a), an ex-
change of security instruments is not actually tax free. 07 If a taxpayer
receives cash or property in a tax-free reorganization, other than stock or
securities, the taxpayer has "boot."1°8 If a taxpayer receives boot, he is
taxed on that boot to the extent of the fair market value of the boot re-
ceived or his realized gain, whichever amount is less.l°9 Boot not only
includes money or property the taxpayer receives in the exchange, but
also includes some amounts from an exchange of security instruments.110
If the principal amount of the security instrument received is greater than
the principal amount of the security instrument given up in the exchange,
then the taxpayer is taxed on the fair market value of the excess of the
principal amount received over the principal amount of the debt instru-
ment given up."I'
It may be true that holders of security instruments have some tax ad-
vantages in a tax-free exchange in the context of gain because the taxpay-
ers are taxed on the increased value of the principal amount that they are
receiving rather than the full amount of their realized gain.1 However,
the principal amount of a debt instrument is not tied to how much the
taxpayer paid for the security instrument or what the fair market value of
the security instrument is at the time of the exchange; therefore, the gain
that a taxpayer recognizes on an exchange of security instruments does
not reflect the actual amount of gain a taxpayer has on the exchange."'The fair market value of a debt instrument is tied not only to the princi-
106. See H.R. REP. No. 73-704, at 1, 10.
107. See I.R.C. §§ 354(a)(2), 356(d)(2)(B) (2006).
108. See § 356(a). Essentially, boot is additional cash or property that the taxpayer
receives in an exchange beyond simply stock or securities permitted to be received in a
reorganization tax-free. See id.; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 195 (8th ed. 2004).
109. See I.R.C. § 356(a). In certain cases, boot may be treated as a dividend to the
taxpayer. See § 356(a)(2). Boot, however, will not be treated as a dividend if received by a
security holder who is not a stockholder. See Rev. Rul. 71-427, 1971-2 C.B. 183, 184 (ruling
that section 356(a)(2) was inapplicable to the receipt of boot by a debenture holder).
110. See I.R.C. § 356(d)(2)(B).
111. See id. The tax only applies if the realized gain is at least equal to the fair market
value of the excess principal amount. See § 354(a)(2)(A). The fair market value of the
excess principal amount is treated as boot. See §§ 354(a)(2), 356(d)(2)(B); Treas. Reg. §
1.356-3(a) (as amended in 2000). If the taxpayer has any realized gain on the reorganiza-
tion, he will recognize gain on the boot to the extent of the gain. See I.R.C. § 356(a)(1). If,
however, the taxpayer does not have a realized gain on the reorganization, he will not
recognize any gain on the distribution of the boot. See id.
112. See § 356(d)(2)(B).
113. See Land, supra note 28, at 62.
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pal amount of the debt instrument but also to several other factors, such
as the interest rate on the debt instrument, the term, the financial and
credit status of the corporation, and the current market interest rate.
Because the statute provides that taxpayers should calculate gain on the
basis of only the principal amount, the gain the taxpayer recognizes does
not accurately reflect the taxpayer's actual economic gain.
Congress included the provision that holders of security instruments
are taxed on the excess principal amount of security instruments ex-
changed because Congress wanted to tax the additional principal
amount."' Since the principal amount represents what the debt holder
receives if the corporation liquidates, this amount represented a greater
underlying interest in the corporation. By receiving an additional right to
principal, the debt holder has a greater interest in the underlying corpo-
ration. Congress wanted to tax this additional amount without requiring
the taxpayer to recognize the entire amount of inherent gain he might
116have with respect to the security instrument. Because the computation
of gain does not, however, take into account other factors-such as inter-
est rates, terms, or credit-worthiness of the corporation--it is not an ac-
curate reflection of the taxpayer's actual economic gain.
The taxpayer will not recognize gain or loss on the exchange, even if
the fair market value of the two interests is different, as long as the prin-
cipal amounts of the security instruments exchanged are the same."7 If
the principal amount of the security instrument received in an exchange
is greater than the principal amount of the security instrument given up,
114. Cf. id.
115. See H.R. REP. No. 83-1337, at 39-41 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017,
4060, 4221 (citing Comm'r v. Neustadt's Trust, 131 F.2d 528 (2d Cir. 1942)).
116. Id.
117. For example, if a taxpayer held a security instrument in a distressed company, the
security instrument would not have a fair market value equal to its principal amount be-
cause the market would take into account the likelihood (or lack thereof) of a possibility of
repayment; therefore, it is likely that the fair market value of the debt instrument might be
less than the principal amount. If, in the exchange, the unstable company is acquired by a
wealthy, stable financial company, the fair market value of the new debt instrument with
the same face value could be worth significantly more than the principal amount because
the market would factor- in the likelihood of being paid on the principal amount. There-
fore, the principal amounts are not truly representative of what a taxpayer is either receiv-
ing or giving up; and yet, these amounts are used to determine the amount of gain.
If section 354 applies, and the holder does not recognize any gain, his basis in the new
debt instrument will be a transferred basis, meaning that it will be equal to the basis of the
security instrument he gave up in the exchange. See I.R.C. § 358(a)(1). In addition, the
taxpayer will be able to carryover his holding period from the old security instrument. See
§ 1223(1). If the holder of a security instrument recognizes gain on the exchange of a secu-
rity instrument, then his adjusted basis in the new security instrument will be equal to the
adjusted basis in the old security instrument, reduced by the fair market value of the excess
principal amount received and increased by the amount of any gain recognized on the
exchange. See § 356(a)(1).
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the taxpayer will recognize gain equal to the fair market value of the ex-
cess principal amount, irrespective of whether the taxpayer actually has
any economic gain or loss on the exchange."' This tax treatment appears
to be contradictory to the earlier concerns of Congress, that taxing reor-
ganizations would be "economically unsound."'1 9 Rather, it appears that
by including security instruments in the reorganization provisions Con-
gress has unintentionally created the "economically unsound" conditions
about which it was concerned by taxing gains that are simply on paper.
2 0
Indeed, Congress actually has created an economically unsound posi-
tion. Even though a holder of a security instrument has taxable gain that
he must recognize under the Code, he might actually have an economic
loss if the security instrument he receives in the exchange is worth less
than what he paid for his original security instrument. The taxpayer is
better off selling his investment than participating in the exchange be-
cause the taxpayer would then be able to recognize his loss and can avoid
recognizing gain. This makes participation in the reorganization provi-
sions for holders of security instruments economically unsound. Instead,
taxpayers are better off not participating in the reorganization. This dis-
courages their continuing interest in the corporation and instead encour-
ages them to cash out their investment, which is inconsistent with Con-
gress' goal to promote long-term investments.
In a straight taxable exchange, the taxpayer may have a recognized
loss, even though the principal amount of the debt instrument received
may be more than the principal amount of the debt instrument ex-
changed. If, instead, the same exchange is given tax-free treatment under
the reorganization provisions, although the taxpayer has an economic
loss, the taxpayer must recognize, and pay tax on, a gain.'
2
1
118. See §§ 354(a)(2), 356(d)(2)(B). Sections 354(a)(2)(A) and 356 also discuss the fair
market value of excess principal amount. See Treas. Reg. § 1.356-3(a) (as amended in
2000); MICHAEL J. KLIEGMAN, SINGLE ENTITY REORGANIZATIONS:
RECAPITALIZATIONS AND F REORGANIZATIONS A-32 (2001). In addition to the fair
market value of the excess principal amount of securities received in a tax-free reorganiza-
tion, if the holder receives any amounts in exchange for any interest accrued (including any
accrued OlD) on the security instrument as of the date of the exchange, the holder must
include those amounts in income. See I.R.C. § 354(a)(2)(B). If, however, the taxpayer
does not have any economic gain on the reorganization because the fair market value of
the stock and securities received is less than his adjusted basis in the stock and securities
exchanged, the taxpayer could immediately turn around and sell the debt instruments or
cause the corporation to retire the bonds under section 1271. See BITrKER & EUSTICE,
supra note 43, 12.27[5] [a]. This possibility, which was created by the tax consequences to
security holders, is not consistent with current public policy to encourage maintaining long-
term investment in corporations.
119. See S. REP. No. 67-275, at 11-12 (1921).
120. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
121. See I.R.C. §§ 354(a)(2), 356(c), (d)(2)(B).
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In an exchange of debt instruments that does not qualify for tax-free
treatment, a taxpayer is taxed on the difference between the taxpayer's
adjusted basis in the security instrument and the fair market value of the
debt instrument that he receives in the exchange. 22 If a taxpayer is ex-
changing stock or securities pursuant to a tax-free reorganization in addi-
tion to his exchange of boot, then the taxpayer will still have to recognize
gain and will also be prevented from recognizing loss, just as holders of• . 121
security instruments are precluded .
C. The Corporation's Tax Consequences
Most of the discussion thus far has been focused on the tax conse-
quences to a holder of a security instrument rather than on the tax conse-
quences of the corporation issuing the original or new security instru-
ment. Issuing new security instruments does not generally have any tax
consequences for the corporation.24 A corporation will, however, have to
recognize any cancellation of indebtedness income on the exchange.'21
As in a taxable debt-for-debt exchange, if the new debt instrument has an
issue price in excess of the old debt instrument's issue price, the corpora-
tion will have cancellation of indebtedness income because the corpora-
tion has been relieved of that amount of debt.26
Cancellation of indebtedness occurs when a debt owed by a taxpayer is
discharged.'2 Unless certain exclusions apply, the amount of the debt
that the taxpayer is relieved from paying will be taxable as gross in-
come.'2 Cancellation of indebtedness is determined by using the issue
price of the security instruments exchanged. 29 The fact that an exchange
of securities takes place in connection with a tax-free reorganization will
not allow the corporation non-recognition of any cancellation of indebt-
edness income.3 In other words, a corporation that exchanges an out-
122. See § 1001; Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1001-1(g) (as amended in 1996), 1.1001-3 (as amended
in 1996), 1.354-1(d) ex. 4 (as amended in 2000). An exchange might be taxable, not only
because debt instruments are not security instruments, but even if one debt instrument in
the exchange is not a security instrument. Treas. Reg. § 1.356-3 (as amended in 2000).
123. See I.R.C. § 356(a)(1), (c).
124. In the case of an A, B, C, D, or F reorganization, section 361 provides for non-
recognition to the corporation. See § 361. In the case of an E reorganization, section 1032
also provides for no recognition. See § 1032.
125. See § 61(a)(12).
126. See §§ 61(a)(12), 108(e)(10).
127. See § 108(e)(10).
128. See § 108(a), (e)(10).
129. See § 108(e)(10); Treas. Reg. § 1.108-1(d)(5) (as amended in 1996).
130. There is no exception for tax-free reorganizations in the exceptions for cancella-
tion of indebtedness income in section 108. See I.R.C. § 108(a), (e)(10).
From 1984 to 1990, section 1275(a)(4) used the adjusted issue price of the old debt in-
strument as the floor on the issue price of the new debt instrument, and therefore, original
issue discount of the new debt instrument could not exceed the original issue discount of
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standing security instrument for a new security instrument will have in-
come equal to the amount that the corporation has been relieved of pay-
ing."' The corporation will have income equal to the amount that the
adjusted issue price of the old security instrument exceeds the issue price
of the new security instrument.
32
As discussed earlier, the issue price of a security instrument may be less
than the principal amount of a security instrument.33 While the corpora-
tion is using the issue price of a security instrument to determine any can-
cellation of indebtedness income, the holder of the security instrument
must use the principal amount of the security instrument to determine
any gain on the exchange."3 For example, a taxpayer might exchange a
security instrument with a $1000 principal amount, an 8% interest rate,
and a fair market value and issue price of $1000 for a new security in-
strument with a principal amount of $1050, a 6% interest rate, and a fair
market value of $900.135 The issue price of the new debt instrument
would be the fair market value of the old debt instrument, here $1000.136
The corporation will have $100 of cancellation of indebtedness income,
even if the corporation has the ability and intention to pay the taxpayer
the full $1050 principal amount on the due date.'3 7 In addition, the tax-
payer will have gain equal to the fair market value of the $50 excess prin-
cipal amount.
3 8
the old debt instrument-unless the stated redemption price at maturity had also increased
in the debt exchange. See I.R.C. § 1275(a)(4) (1985); I.R.C. § 1275(a)(4) (1990). The in-
tent behind this provision was to lower the amount of OID and cancellation of indebted-
ness income in a security for security recapitalization in the case of financially distressed
companies. See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 43, 12.27[4][b]. In 1990, section
1275(a)(4) was amended to provide that in recapitalizations, security exchanges were to be
treated in the same manner as regular debt exchanges for purposes of original issue dis-
count and cancellation of indebtedness income-using the same issue price determination
rules under sections 1273 and 1274. See id.
131. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(12). For the purposes of this Article, the corporations discussed
are not insolvent or in bankruptcy; therefore, the exceptions from cancellation of indebt-
edness income contained in section 108(a)(1)(A) and (B) will not be discussed.
132. See § 108(e)(10).
133. See supra note 117.
134. See §§ 108(e)(10), 354(a)(2). 356(d)(2)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.108-1(d)(5) (1994).
135. The fair market value of a security instrument with a $1000 principal amount and
an 8% interest rate might be $900 if the current going interest rate for debt instruments is
at 12%.
136. See I.R.C. § 1273(b)(3).
137. When the corporation does pay the $50 of principal amount above the issue price,
it will be taxed to the taxpayer as interest. See §§ 61(a)(4), 354(a)(2)(B).
138. See § 354(a)(2)(B). Prior to 1984, when a corporation exchanged its outstanding
debt instruments for stock, it was non-taxable to both the debt holders or stockholders and
the corporation, with an exception for cancellation of indebtedness income. See I.R.C. §
108(e) (1983). In 1984, Congress limited the exception for cancellation of indebtedness
income to insolvent and bankrupt corporations. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L.
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IV. TREATMENT OF TAXABLE DEBT-FOR-DEBT EXCHANGES
A. Debt-for-Debt Exchanges
To examine and critique the tax treatment of an exchange of security
instruments in corporate reorganizations, it is necessary to examine the
tax treatment of a fully taxable exchange of debt instruments outside of
the tax-free reorganization context. An exchange of one debt instrument
for another debt instrument will be fully taxable if it is treated as a sale or
exchange for tax purposes. 39 In a tax-free reorganization, if a taxpayer
does not hold stock or securities but holds non-security debt instruments,
and exchanges them pursuant to the reorganization, the taxpayer will be
subject to the sale or exchange provisions applicable to a debt exchange
outside of the reorganization context.140 The taxpayer's exchange of debt
instruments will be taxed the same whether or not the exchange is pursu-• - 141
ant to a tax-free reorganization.
No. 98-369, § 59, 98 Stat. 494, 576. Then, in 1993, Congress repealed this exception all
together. See Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13226, 107 Stat.
416, 487. Thereafter, corporations were treated as though they bought the debt instru-
ments back for an amount equal to the fair market value of the stock that the corporation
exchanged. I.R.C. § 1273(b). Any amount that the principal amount of the debt instru-
ment exceeded the fair market value of the stock given up was cancellation of indebted-
ness income to the corporation. § 61(a)(12).
139. See § 1001(c).
140. See §§ 354(a), 1001(c).
141. This is assuming that the taxpayer did not also exchange additional stock or secu-
rities in the reorganization. Otherwise, the taxpayer would still be precluded from recog-
nizing the loss. See § 356(c).
The restriction on the recognition of losses is not limited to an exchange of security
instruments; rather, it extends to other types of exchanges as well. Whether a taxpayer is
permitted to recognize a loss in connection with a tax-free reorganization hinges not only
on whether the exchange of security instruments is for other security instruments (or stock
exchanged for other stock), but also if there is an exchange of other types of property. If a
corporation is engaged in a tax-free reorganization and a person exchanges stock or securi-
ties for cash or for any other property that does not qualify in the reorganization, the tax-
payer has gain or loss equal to the difference between the taxpayer's adjusted basis in the
stock or securities and the amount of cash or the fair market value of the property the
taxpayer received. See § 356(a)(1). Unlike an exchange of stock for stock, or security
instruments for security instruments, a taxpayer in such an exchange could recognize a loss
realized on the exchange. The tax consequences of exchanges in tax-free reorganizations
that do not qualify for tax-free treatment, or semi-tax-free treatment, are logical and con-
sistent with the way sales and exchanges are normally taxed in the case of taxable gain. See
§ 1001.
If, however, a taxpayer exchanged stock for stock, or a security instrument for a security
instrument, pursuant to a tax-free reorganization and then also exchanged stock and a
security instrument for a non-security debt instrument, the taxpayer would have to recog-
nize any gain on the exchange of the stock or security instrument for the non-security debt
instrument and once again, would not be able to recognize a loss. See § 356(a), (c). This
tax treatment would be the same whether the property received in the exchange was a
non-security debt instrument, cash, or another type of property. See § 356(a)(1), (c). The
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Often an exchange of debt instruments can take place for tax purposes
when the taxpayer has, in fact, exchanged nothing from a practical stand-
point. Rather, the taxpayer holds exactly the same piece of paper that he
held before the exchange. The taxpayer may participate in a taxable ex-
change even though he may still hold exactly the same debt instrument in
exactly the same corporation; the only change is that the corporation has
notified the taxpayer that the term of the debt instrument has changed, or
that the land securing the debt instrument has been sold and new prop-
142erty is securing the debt instrument. Because the ownership rights of
the holder of the debt instrument have been changed or altered, this is
treated as a sale or exchange, even though from the taxpayer's perspec-
tive, he still owns the same debt instrument in the same company that he
owned before the "exchange.,
143
Alternatively, the taxpayer may actually exchange his debt instrument
in the target corporation for a new debt instrument in an acquiring corpo-
ration, which issues the taxpayer a new debt instrument pursuant to the
reorganization. From the taxpayer's perspective, the taxpayer owns a
new debt instrument in a new company. For tax purposes, however, as
long as the terms of the new debt instrument remain the same-such as
the interest rate, the payment schedule, and the term-then even though
a new corporation will be making payments to the taxpayer, because the
debt instrument has not been significantly modified, there is no sale or
exchange and therefore, no taxable event.44
Whether or not there is a taxable exchange depends on whether or not
there has been a modification of the debt instrument. If there has been
a modification, the next question is whether the modification is signifi-
cant. 46 The regulations under section 1001 dictate whether changes or
modifications in a debt instrument are significant enough to constitute a
taxpayer is now prevented from recognizing a loss that he could previously recognize sim-
ply because we have interjected into the exchange a tax-free exchange of stock or securi-
ties. See § 356(c).
If, in connection with a tax-free reorganization, a taxpayer exchanges stock in a corpo-
ration for a security instrument in the corporation, then the taxpayer will be deemed to
receive an amount of boot equal to the fair market value of the security instrument. See §§
354(a)(2)(A)(ii), 356(d). The taxpayer will therefore recognize gain equal to the differ-
ence between his adjusted basis in the stock surrendered in the exchange and the fair mar-
ket value of the security instruments received in the exchange. See § 356(a)(1), (d)(1).
This tax result appears to be appropriate and consistent with basic tax principles and the
concept of a sale, exchange, or disposition under section 1001. See § 356(a)(1), (c), (d).
142. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-3(e)(2), (e)(4)(i), (e)(4)(iv) (as amended in 1996).
143. See § 1.1001-3(b). This is assuming that the changes to the taxpayer's ownership
rights in the debt instrument qualify as a "significant modification." See § 1.1001-3(a), (b).
144. See § 1.1001-3 (b), (e)(4)(i)(C).
145. See § 1.1001-3(a)-(c).
146. See § 1.1001-3(b), (e)-(f).
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sale or exchange and therefore taxable. 47 For purposes of determining
whether there has been a significant modification and a taxable exchange,
the characterization of a debt instrument as a security instrument, as op-
posed to a non-security debt instrument, is completely irrelevant."
The rules under section 1001 apply to a taxable exchange of debt in-
struments, including both exchanges that take place in a reorganization
that do not actually qualify for tax-free treatment and straight taxable
exchanges of debt instruments outside of the tax-free reorganization con-
text.49 In a taxable exchange of debt instruments, the holder may recog-
nize gain or loss,5° the corporation that issued the original debt instru-
ment may have cancellation of indebtedness income,15 and the holder
may also have original issue discount (OID),1 2 market discount, or bond
premium in the new debt instrument.'
B. Modifications Under Section 1001
In general, an exchange of debt instruments will only trigger gain or
loss if the exchange constitutes a sale or disposition under section 1001."'
An exchange of debt instruments will constitute a sale or disposition if
the new debt instrument is materially different "in kind or in extent"
from the old debt instrument.' The Treasury Regulations under section
1001 provide that a debt instrument will be materially different if there is
a significant modification of the debt instrument that results in a sale or
exchange of the debt instruments.5 6 There is essentially a two-part test to
determine whether the debt instruments are materially different. The first
test examines the terms of the debt instrument to determine whether
there has been a "modification.', 5 7 Any modification of a debt instru-
147. See § 1.1001-3(a), (b), (e).
148. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text. Of course, if an exchange is pur-
suant to a tax-free reorganization, then an exchange of security instruments will not be
subject to the provisions of section 1001 and instead will be taxed according to the tax-free
reorganization provisions as discussed earlier. See I.R.C. §§ 354(a), 1001(a) (2006). As-
suming, however, that an exchange is outside of the tax-free reorganization context,
whether or not a debt instrument is a security instrument is completely irrelevant for pur-
poses of calculating gain under the section 1001 provisions. See § 1001.




153. See § 1278(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-1(b)(2) (as amended in 2002).
154. See I.R.C. § 1001(a); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1001-1(a) (as amended in 1996), 1.1001-3(a)
(as amended in 1996).
155. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-3(a)-(b).
156. See § 1.1001-3(b).
157. See § 1.1001-3(c). Treasury Regulation 1.1001-3 lays out the basic framework to
determine if a new debt instrument is materially different from the old debt instrument.
See generally § 1.1001-3.
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ment-whether the modification is the result of an express agreement
between the taxpayer and the corporation or is otherwise modified such
as by the conduct of the parties-will be considered when determining
whether there has been a sale, exchange, or disposition for tax pur-
poses.'58 If there has been a modification, then the second test will be
applied to determine whether the modification was a significant modifica-
tion. 59 If there has simply been a modification of a debt instrument, but
the modification does not rise to the level of a significant modification,
then there will not be a taxable sale or exchange of the debt instru-
ments.60
A modification of a debt instrument is essentially any change to the
rights or obligations of either the holder or the issuer of the debt instru-
ment.16' Examples of a modification of a debt instrument are changes to:
the length of the term of the debt instrument, the obligor on the debt
instrument, the interest rate, or the type or amount of property securing
the debt instrument.162 Once it is determined that there has been a modi-
fication to the terms of the debt instrument, the next determination is
whether the modification rises to the level of a significant modification
that will trigger a sale or exchange.
A modification is considered significant if the rights and obligations of
the holder or the issuer are changed or altered to such a degree that the
modification is "economically significant."' 63 The Treasury Regulations
provide specific rules for determining whether a modification rises to the
158. See § 1.1001-3(c)(1)(i).
159. See § 1.1001-3(e).
160. See § 1.1001-3(b). Because there has not been a sale or disposition for tax pur-
poses, some commentators have argued that section 108(e)(10) is not implicated and there-
fore would not give rise to cancellation of indebtedness income. See 2 MARTIN D.
GINSBURG & JACK S. LEVIN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND BUYOUTS 605 (2004)
(stating "[w]hile there is nothing in Code § 108(e)(10) that limits the application of that
provision to an 'exchange' under Code § 1001, it would appear logical that the Code § 1001
standard should govern" and preclude cancellation of indebtedness income).
Alternatively, the same commentators note that under section 108(e)(4), if a person is
related to the corporation acquires its indebtedness from a holder, provided the holder is
not related to the corporation, then the corporation will recognize cancellation of indebt-
edness "income to the extent [that] the adjusted issue price of the [debt instrument] ex-
ceeds the [acquiror's] adjusted basis in the [debt instrument] on the acquisition date." Id.;
see also I.R.C. § 108(e)(4). The test for determining who is related to the corporation
starts on the date the debt instrument is acquired, which, if applied in a tax-free reorgani-
zation, would give rise to cancellation of indebtedness income. See GINSBURG & LEVIN,
supra, 605.
161. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-3(c)(1)(i); see also Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499
U.S. 554, 565-67 (1991) (holding that there is a taxable exchange of debt instruments if the
new properties are materially different, i.e., if the taxpayer enjoys new legal entitlements
that were not present in the old property).
162. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-3(c)(2)(i), (d) exs. 8-9.
163. See § 1.1001-3(e)(1).
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level of a significant modification in certain cases, such as a change in1641616
yield,' a change in payment dates, a change in the obligor, or a
change in the amount of security for the debt instrument or a credit en-
hancement of the obligor. 67 In addition to these specific changes to a
debt instrument's terms, if there are several modifications to a debt in-
strument that may not constitute a significant modification when taken
alone but may constitute a significant modification collectively, they must
be tested together to determine whether the modifications alter the debt
instrument in an economically significant way.68
As mentioned above, the Treasury Regulations specifically discuss
whether a change in obligor will constitute a significant modification.169
A change of obligor in a debt instrument has different rules depending on
170whether the debt is a recourse debt or a non-recourse debt instrument.
A change of obligor in a non-recourse debt instrument will generally not
constitute a significant modification.1 71 In the case of a recourse debt in-
strument, a change in an obligor will generally constitute a significant
modification subject to certain exclusions. 172 A change of an obligor on a
recourse debt instrument will not be a significant modification if: (1) the
new obligor acquired substantially all of the assets of the prior obligor,
164. See § 1.1001-3(e)(2). A change in the yield of a debt instrument will be significant
if the annual yield of the new debt instrument differs from the old debt instrument by more
than the greater of twenty-five basis points or 5%. § 1.1001-3(e)(2)(ii).
165. See § 1.1001-3(e)(3). A change in the payment dates will be a significant modifica-
tion if it results in a "material deferral" of scheduled payments. Id. There is a safe harbor
in the regulations that provides that if the term of the debt instrument is only extended for
the lesser of five years or 50% of the original term of the debt instrument, there will not be
a material deferral and hence not a significant modification. § 1.1001-3(e)(3)(ii).
166. See § 1.1001-3(e)(4)(i)(A). However, certain changes in the obligor on a debt
instrument will not constitute a significant modification. In particular, the substitution of a
new obligor will not be a significant modification if the new obligor acquired substantially
all of the assets of the former obligor. See § 1.1001-3(e)(4)(i)(C). The acquiring corpora-
tion in a tax-free reorganization will, in many cases, qualify as acquiring substantially all of
the assets of the target corporation. See KEYES, supra note 71, 3.05(1)(c)(iv) (stating
that "[a]s a policy matter, such changes [tax-free liquidations or mergers] alone should not
be viewed as material").
167. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-3(e)(4)(iv). A change in the property securing the debt
or the credit enhancement of the obligor occurs if there is a change in payment expecta-
tions. Id.
168. See § 1.1001-3(e)(1). The taxpayer must examine all of the facts and circum-
stances of the modification to determine whether or not the debt instrument's terms have
been changed in an economically significant manner. See id.
169. See § 1.1001-3(e)(4)(i)(A).
170. See § 1.1001-3(e)(4)(i)-(ii).




such as in a reorganization; (2) there is not a change in payment expecta-
tions; and (3) there is not a significant alteration of the debt instrument.'
73
A change in payment expectations occurs if the corporation's ability to
pay the debt instrument, as a result of the change or modification, has
been substantially enhanced. 74 Substantial enhancement occurs when the
corporation's ability to pay the debt instrument was speculative prior to
the modification, and after the modification, the corporation's ability to
pay the debt instrument is adequate. 75 Alternatively, it will also consti-
tute a change in payment expectations if, prior to the modification, the
corporation's ability to make the payments was adequate, and after the
modification, the corporation's ability to make the payments is primarily
speculative.176
If the modification is significant, the taxpayer will have a taxable ex-
change and will recognize gain or loss accordingly, and the corporation
may recognize cancellation of indebtedness income.' 77 If there has not
been a significant modification, there will not be a taxable exchange, and
the taxpayer will not recognize any gain or loss on the exchange.'78 Es-
sentially, if the debt instrument's terms have not changed significantly,
then the taxpayer owns the same property he owned previously and,
therefore, there is not a taxable event.
For example, if a taxpayer holds a debt instrument of Target, and Tar-
get merges into Acquiring Corporation in a tax-free reorganization, with
Acquiring gaining all of Target's assets and assuming all of Target's li-
abilities, the obligor on the taxpayer's debt instrument would change
from Target to Acquiring. If the taxpayer held a security instrument in
Target and in exchange received a security instrument in Acquiring, as
described earlier, the taxpayer would recognize gain on the exchange
equal to the fair market value of the excess principal amount but would
not be able to recognize any loss. 1 79 The taxpayer would take a trans-
ferred basis in the new debt instrument, which would have an adjusted
issue price equal to the fair market value of the debt instrument given up
in the exchange.' 8° Alternatively, if, in the same tax-free reorganization,
the taxpayer exchanged a non-security debt instrument for another non-
security debt instrument, the exchange would not qualify under the reor-
ganization provisions and would therefore have to be examined under
the regulations under section 1001. At this point, we would consider
173. See § 1.1001-3(e)(4)(i)(B), (C), (E).
174. See § 1.1001-3(e)(4)(iv)(A).
175. § 1.1001-3(e)(4)(vi)(A)(1).
176. § 1.1001-3(e)(4)(vi)(A)(2).
177. See I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(12), 1001(c) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-3(b).
178. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1001-1(a) (as amended in 1996), 1.1001-3(a)-(b).
179. See I.R.C. § 356(c), (d)(2)(B).
180. Adjusted by any OlD, market discount, or bond premium. Cf. § 358.
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whether there had been a significant modification of the non-security
debt instrument."' Because Acquiring was acquiring substantially all of
Target's assets (and assuming there was no change in payment expecta-
tions), there would not be a significant modification of the debt instru-
ments.' 82 Therefore, the taxpayer would not recognize any gain or loss on
the exchange and would continue with the same adjusted basis and issue
price.'
As discussed in Part III.A, in Revenue Ruling 2004-78, the IRS deter-
mined that certain debt instruments would qualify as security instru-
ments, and therefore, the exchange would qualify as a tax-free exchange
pursuant to a reorganization. ' As a result, the taxpayer would not rec-
ognize any gain or loss on the exchange.'85 In that Revenue Ruling, the
taxpayer received two-year notes that the IRS ruled were security in-
struments because the notes given up in the exchange were security in-
struments and the terms of the note received were nearly identical to the
terms of the note exchanged. 86 It is doubtful and unlikely that the debt
instruments received would have otherwise constituted a security instru-
ment because of the short-term nature of the debt instruments.
In that same Revenue Ruling, however, the IRS acknowledged that if
the exchange had fallen outside of the reorganization provisions, the
change in interest rate from the old debt instrument to the new debt in-
strument would have constituted a significant modification.'" Therefore,
had the tax-free reorganization provisions not applied to the exchange,
the exchange would have been a taxable sale or exchange. If there had
been a sale or exchange in Revenue Ruling 2004-78 because the debt
instrument received had not been characterized as a security instrument,
the taxpayer would have recognized gain or loss on the exchange equal to
the difference between the issue price of the debt instrument he received
and his adjusted basis in the debt instrument given up in the exchange.'88
The main difference between taxable treatment outside of the tax-free
reorganization provisions and partially tax-free treatment under the tax-
free reorganization provisions is that in the context of a taxable sale or
exchange, the taxpayer may recognize any losses he may have.' 9 The
amount of gain recognized by the taxpayer under the two different tax
181. See supra Part IV.A.
182. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-3(e)(4)(i)(C).
183. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
184. See Rev. Rul. 2004-78, 2004-31 I.R.B. 108, 109.
185. See id.
186. See id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-3(e)(4).
187. See Rev. Rul. 2004-78, 2004-31 I.R.B. 108, 109.
188. See I.R.C. § 1001(c) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(g) (as amended in 1996).
189. Compare I.R.C. § 165(a), with § 354(a).
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treatments may also differ; which method is more advantageous to the
taxpayer depends on the particular circumstances of the exchange.
If there is a significant modification of a debt instrument, then there is a
taxable sale or exchange of the debt instrument. Thus, the holder will
recognize gain or loss equal to the difference between the taxpayer's
amount realized and his adjusted basis in the old debt instrument90The
holder's amount realized would be equal to the issue price of the new
debt instrument. 91 If the debt instrument is not publicly traded, then the
issue price will be equal to its stated principal amount192
If the only modification to a debt instrument is a change in the obligor,
as in a taxable exchange taking place in connection with a tax-free reor-
ganization or merger, then under section 1001, there is no significant
modification and therefore no sale, exchange, or other disposition for tax
purposes. 193
C. Using the Issue Price Versus Principal Amount in
Tax-Free Reorganizations
To determine the amount of taxable gain in a tax-free reorganization,
taxpayers are instructed to use the principal amount of the security in-
strument rather than the issue price of the security instrument.' 94 The
190. See 3§ 165(a), 1001(a), (c). The holder's adjusted basis in the old debt instrument
will be what the holder paid for it, increased by any market discount the holder previously
included in income, reduced by any amortizable bond premium previously allowed, and
further reduced by any principal payments already made on the debt instrument. See §§
1016, 1272(a), 1278(a). The holder's adjusted basis in the new debt instrument would be
equal to his amount realized (the issue price of the new debt instrument). See § 1012.
191. See § 1001(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(g).
192. See I.R.C. § 1274.
193. See Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Comm'r, 287 U.S. 462, 468-70 (1933);
Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-3(e)(4)(i)(C) (as amended in 1996). If the exchange is pursuant to a
tax-free reorganization where taxpayers exchanged stock for stock and also exchanged
security instruments for new debt instruments in the same corporation that did not qualify
as security instruments, the new debt instruments would be boot to the taxpayer. See
I.R.C. § 356(a)(1). The holder of the security instrument will have taxable gain equal to
the fair market value of the debt instrument. See id. The taxpayer's gain will be limited to
the amount of gain realized in the reorganization. See id. Because the exchange would
partially qualify under section 354, the taxpayer would not recognize any losses inherent in
the exchange. See § 356(c).
194. See 33 354(a)(2), 356(d)(2)(B). Using the principal amount of a security instru-
ment rather than the issue price to determine the amount of taxable gain is incorrect and
further exacerbates the problem by distorting the true economic gain or loss that a tax-
payer may have. Using the principal amount of a security instrument does not reflect the
true and actual economic amount of gain or loss that a taxpayer has; rather, it is an artifi-
cial number that can trigger gain unjustifiably to a taxpayer in a tax-free reorganization
because the principal amount of a debt instrument does not reflect the adjusted basis of a
debt instrument or the fair market value of a debt instrument. This inconsistency has been
raised several times by commentators, but has never been corrected. Because the issue
price of a security instrument is a more accurate representation of the security instrument's
2006]
Catholic University Law Review
principal amount of a debt instrument is generally equal to the amounts
due under the note less any stated interest.'95
While the principal amount of a newly received security instrument
may exceed the principal amount of the old security instrument, which
results in the taxpayer recognizing gain, the taxpayer may actually end up
with less profit or true economic gain than the taxpayer is required to
recognize. For example, if a taxpayer exchanges a security instrument in
a corporation with a $1000 principal amount, a 10% interest rate, and a
fair market value, using the excess of the issue price over the adjusted basis of the debt
instrument rather than the excess principal amount when determining the gain a taxpayer
has in a tax-free reorganization represents a more correct figure and is more representative
of the taxpayer's economic gain. See Yaron Z. Reich, Jodi J. Schwartz & David M.
Rievman, Effect of OBRA '90 on Debt-for-Debt Exchanges, 51 TAX NOTES 79, 83 (1991);
Michael L. Schler, NYSBA Sees Flaws in Treatment of Debt Securities Received in Corpo-
rate Reorgs., TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 15, 1995, 95 TNT 31-25 (LEXIS); see also Carolyn
Joy Lee, NYSBA Comments on Tax Provisions of President's Plan, TAX NOTES TODAY,
Dec. 28, 1995, 95 TNT 252-25 (LEXIS) (commenting that the same issue-principal
amount versus issue price-arises in connection with an exchange of nonqualified pre-
ferred stock in a reorganization and stating that the "rule, literally applied, would create
taxable gain whenever an appreciated debt security is surrendered for preferred stock with
a value above the debt security's adjusted issue price, even if the debt and preferred have
the same value. This would be particularly harsh if, for example, the new preferred and
the old debt had substantially the same terms"). Because the rules enacted regarding
nonqualified preferred stock instead treat nonqualified preferred stock as qualified pre-
ferred stock if it is exchanged for other nonqualified preferred stock with substantially
identical terms, an exchange of nonqualified preferred stock will not encounter the same
unfairness and inconsistent tax treatment as regular debt security instruments. See I.R.C.
§ 354(a)(2)(C); Treas. Reg. § 1.356-7(b). The flaw of using principal amount was also
acknowledged by Congress in its proposed amendments to section 356 in 1991 although it
was never rectified. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 102D CONG., TECHNICAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX SIMPLIFICATION ACT OF 1991, at 80 (J. Comm. Print 1991)
[hereinafter TECHNICAL EXPLANATIONS].
The reasoning behind defining nonqualified preferred stock as a separate type of inter-
est in a corporation different from qualified preferred stock was that nonqualified pre-
ferred stock resembled debt. Therefore, one must wonder why, in 1997, Congress chose
not to impose the same onerous gain recognition rules on nonqualified preferred stock.
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1014, 111 Stat. 788, 919; J. COMM. ON
TAXATION, 105TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN
1997, at 210 (J. Comm. Print 1997).
Tax legislation to change principal amount to issue price in sections 354 and 356 was
raised in 1991 to make the reorganization provisions more consistent with the original
issue discount provisions; however, this legislation was never enacted. See TECHNICAL
EXPLANATIONS, supra, at 80.
Some commentators have tried to suggest that when Congress stated "principal
amount" in the Code, it actually meant "issue price" because of the confusion it would
otherwise create. See BARNET PHILLIPS, IV & ROBERT P. ROTHMAN, STRUCTURING
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS -TAX ASPECTS A-89 (3d ed. 2005). It is clear, however, that
Congress views the two terms as separate and distinguishable. See § 312(a)(2) (guiding the
taxpayer to use the principal amount of a debt instrument except where there is OlD and
then to use the aggregate issue price of the debt instrument).
195. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1274-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1996).
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fair market value of $1200 for a security instrument with a $1200 principal
amount, a 4% interest rate, and a fair market value of $1100 in the same
corporation pursuant to a recapitalization, under the reorganization pro-
visions, the taxpayer would have $183.33 of gain.' 96 The taxpayer has
taxable gain of $183.33 because the principal amount was higher in the
security instrument received in the exchange than the principal amount of
the security instrument given up in the exchange, even though the tax-
payer really only has gain of $100 (the difference between his adjusted
basis and the fair market value of what he received). In addition, the
taxpayer has an economic loss of $100 because the fair market value of
the security instrument that the taxpayer received is less than the fair
market value of the security instrument the taxpayer gave up in the ex-
change. Despite the taxpayer's economic value loss on the exchange, the
taxpayer must recognize gain because the Code uses the principal amount
of a security instrument as the measuring factor to determine gain rather
than the fair market value or the issue price of the security instrument.
If, alternatively, the tax-free reorganization provisions do not apply to
an exchange, making the exchange fully taxable, then instead of using the
principal amount, the relevant measurement to the determination is the
issue price of the debt instrument under section 1001. ' 9' An exchange
might be taxable, for example, if the debt instruments do not qualify as
security instruments or because the exchange was not made in connection
with a tax-free reorganization. 98
The issue price of a debt instrument generally represents the fair mar-
ket value of the instrument. Determining the issue price of a debt in-
strument depends on whether or not the note is publicly traded. '99 In
general, in a publicly offered debt issuance, the issue price of a debt in-
strument is the price that the majority of buyers are willing to pay when
196. See Treas. Reg. § 1.356-3(c) ex. 5 (as amended in 2000). Assume that because of
market conditions and the interest rates on the two security instruments that the fair mar-
ket value of the security instrument given up in the exchange ($1200) was greater than the
fair market value of the security instrument given up ($1100).
197. See § 1.1001-1(g).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 41-56.
199. See I.R.C. §§ 1273(b), 1274(a). A debt instrument is considered publicly traded if
it is "traded on an established market." See § 1273(b)(3). A debt instrument is "traded on
an established market" if (1) it is listed on certain security exchanges, interdealer quotation
systems, or certain foreign exchanges or boards of trade; (2) it is traded on certain boards
of trade that are "designated as a contract market ... or on an interbank market"; (3) "it
appears on a system of general circulation ... that provides a reasonable basis to deter-
mine fair market value by disseminating either recent price quotations ... of one or more
identified brokers, dealers, or traders or actual prices . . . of recent sales transactions"; or
(4) "price quotations are readily available from dealers, brokers, or traders" within the
meaning of the applicable Treasury Regulations, and certain other conditions are met.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1273-2(b), (f) (1994).
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the corporation first offers the debt instrument for sale to the public.2°° If
it is paid for in cash, the issue price will be equal to the cash value.20 1 If
the debt instrument is paid for in property and is publicly traded, then the
issue price will be equal to the fair market value of the property.2°  If the
debt instrument is not publicly traded, its issue price will generally be
equal to its principal amount.203
The issue price of a debt instrument will be adjusted by adding or sub-
tracting certain items to the issue price, creating the adjusted issue
price. 2°4 Any OID will be added to the issue price. 2° Any payments that
200. See I.R.C. § 1273(b)(1).
201. See § 1273(b)(1)-(2).
202. See § 1273(b)(1)-(3). If a security instrument is exchanged for a new security
instrument, and both the new and original security instruments are publicly traded, then
the issue price of the new debt instruments is equal to the trading price of the old debt
instruments at the first time the debt instruments are offered to the public. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1273-2(c)(1).
203. See I.R.C. § 1274(a).
204. See § 1272(a)(4); Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-1(b) (as amended in 2002).
205. See I.R.C. § 1272(a)(3)-(4); Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-1(b)(1)(i). OlD is when a debt
instrument's issue price is less than its stated redemption price at maturity. See I.R.C. §
1273(a)(1). The stated redemption price at maturity is the amount a holder will receive
when the debt instrument reaches maturity and is redeemed. See § 1273(a)(1)-(2). As
described above, a debt instrument's issue price is generally equal to the price that most
buyers are willing to pay for a debt instrument the first time it is offered for sale to the
public. See §§ 1273(a)(1)-(2), (b), 1274(a). When a debt instrument has OlD, holders
must include the amount of the discount into income throughout the term of the debt
instrument as it accrues. See §§ 1272(a), 1273(a)(1)-(2). It is very similar to a phantom
interest payment, and constitutes ordinary income to the holder. See §§ 61(a), 1273(a)(1)-
(2). Assume again that a corporation issues a debt instrument with a $1000 principal
amount and a 10% interest rate and, because of corporate issues, the amount the public is
willing to buy the debt instruments for the first time they are offered to the public is $900.
The issue price is therefore $900. Because this is the original issue of the debt instruments
(the first time they are issued to the public), there is a $100 discount, so there is OID of
$100. Here, the corporation will pay the full $1000 principal amount plus 10% interest to
the taxpayer on maturity (when the debt instrument becomes due). If the taxpayer re-
ceives $100 more than he paid for the debt instrument, the $100 would be treated as inter-
est along with the actual interest payment. However, under the OID provisions, the tax-
payer will include the $100 OID in income throughout the term of the note rather than
when the amount is actually paid. See §§ 61(a), 1273(a)(1)-(2). The payment is amortized
and taxed as interest throughout the term of the debt instrument and is added to the ad-
justed issue price of the debt instrument. See § 1273(a)(1), (3).
Market discount occurs after the issue price of a debt instrument has been established
and a taxpayer subsequently buys a debt instrument for less than its issue price. See §
1278(a). Using the earlier example, assume a corporation offers a debt instrument with a
$1000 principal amount and a 10% interest rate. The issue price of the debt instrument is
$900. Then, two years later, a taxpayer decides to buy one of the debt instruments that has
previously been issued, but the corporation is less financially secure than it was previously.
Therefore, the price the taxpayer is willing to pay for the debt instrument is $850. There is
$100 of OID and $50 of market discount. Assuming that the corporation pays what it owes
on the debt instrument, any amounts paid over $850 will be treated as ordinary income,
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have been made with regard to the debt instrument, excluding any inter-
est payments, will be subtracted from the adjusted issue price. The ad-
justed issue price will also be reduced by any bond issuance premium
amortized though the modification date.2 6
The most accurate amount to determine a taxpayer's gain in the reor-
ganization provisions is the debt instrument's fair market value. It would
be ideal to replace the principal amount in the calculation of gain with
the fair market value of the debt instrument represented by the debt in-
strument's issue price. This would also be consistent with other uses of
the debt instrument's issue price for items such as OID, market discount,
and bond premium.
An increase in the principal amount in tax-free reorganizations of a se-
curity instrument represents an increase in the amount that a holder
would be paid if the corporation liquidated. It is an increase in the un-
derlying assets of the corporation, and the logic would follow that be-
cause a holder has a greater interest in these underlying assets, they
should be taxed like a dividend. This taxation is not appropriate, how-
just like interest. See §§ 1276(a), 1278(a). Even though the face amount of the debt is
$1000, only $850 will be treated for tax purposes as principal, and the remaining market
discount and original issue discount are treated as interest. Market discount is not consid-
ered interest for purposes of sections 354(a)(1) and 356(a)(2), and therefore, is not recog-
nized on a debt-for-debt exchange that qualifies as a tax-free reorganization. See §§
1276(a), (d)(1)(B), 1278(a). Instead, any market discount applicable to the old debt in-
struments is transferred to the new debt instruments. See §§ 1276(c)(2)(A), (d)(1)(B),
1278(a); see also JAMES S. EUSTICE, THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1984 3.03[5] (1984).
Thus, in the context of an exchange of a security instrument for a new security instrument
in a tax-free reorganization, if the taxpayer originally purchased the first security instru-
ment with any market discount, that market discount is not altered at all, but rather will
simply be passed on to the new security instrument, as though the security instrument was
purchased with a market discount. See I.R.C. §§ 1276(c)(1)-(2), 1277(b)(2)(B),
1278(a)(1)(D)(iii).
206. See §§ 108(e)(3), 1272(a)(7); Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-1(b)(2). Bond premium or bond
issuance premium is the opposite circumstance from market discount. Instead of paying
less than the issue price for a debt instrument, if there is bond premium, then the taxpayer
paid more for the debt instrument than the issue price of the debt instrument. Thus, the
taxpayer has paid a "premium" for the debt instrument. See Treas. Reg. § 1.163-13(c) (as
amended in 1999). This might occur, for example, if the interest rate is higher than the
current rate offered on other debt instruments. For example, assume that a debt instru-
ment has a principal amount and issue price of $1000 and an interest rate of 10%. The
current interest rate being offered on debt instruments is 4%. Therefore, the taxpayer may
be willing to pay more for the higher interest rate. If the taxpayer paid $1050 for the debt
instrument, the taxpayer would have a $50 premium ($50 over the issue price). The tax-
payer may then deduct the $50 over the term of the debt instrument. See I.R.C. §
1272(a)(7). If an exchange of a security instrument in a corporation for a new security
instrument in the corporation qualifies under the reorganization provisions, and the holder
has a bond premium on the old security instrument, the bond premium will be passed onto
the new security instrument regardless of the new security instrument's issue price and will
continue to be amortized over the term of the debt instrument if the taxpayer so elects.
See §§ 1272(a)(7), 1278(a)(2).
2006]
Catholic University Law Review
ever, for several reasons. First, the taxpayer owns debt and has not, in
fact, received a dividend. Although the taxpayer has received an addi-
tional principal amount on paper, the taxpayer has not received any addi-
tional cash. If the taxpayer actually receives the additional amounts of
principal in the form of cash and the amount he receives is greater than
the amount he paid for the debt instrument, he will have taxable gain.
Until he actually receives these amounts and has "cashed out" his in-
vestment, however, the excess principal amount is only on paper. In ad-
dition, although the taxpayer has received an additional amount of prin-
cipal, the security instrument he receives may not actually be worth any
more than the security instrument he gave up in the exchange. Several
factors go into what a debt instrument is worth, including the interest
rate, the term, the market interest rate, and the credit condition of the
corporation.2 O So, although the taxpayer receives an additional principal
amount on paper, what he owns may actually be worth less. The addi-
tional principal amount may, for example, be given to the taxpayer to
compensate him for such a loss of value. However, without a sale or ex-
change, the taxpayer has not cashed out his interest and therefore should
not be taxed until he does.
V. THE TAx TREATMENT OF SECURITY HOLDERS CREATES UNFAIR
AND INCONSISTENT TAx CONSEQUENCES
The tax treatment of holders of security instruments is inconsistent, in-
equitable, and unnecessarily confusing for several reasons. Applying the
continuity of interest doctrine to security instruments is inappropriate
and complicates the tax treatment of holders of security instruments. The
tax treatment of holders of non-security debt instruments is currently
more advantageous in tax-free reorganizations than the tax treatment of
holders of security instruments, even though a heightened ownership
interest and continuity of interest requirement applies to holders of secu-
rity instruments. This tax treatment produces results that are against
public policy and are inconsistent with the policy motivations of Con-
gress. Therefore, the tax treatment of holders of security instruments
should be corrected, and they should be afforded the same tax treatment
as holders of non-security debt instruments.
A. Treating Security Instruments as a Hybrid Interest Between Debt and
Equity and Requiring Continuity of Interest is Confusing and Inconsistent
Requiring holders of security instruments to meet a continuity of inter-
est requirement is inconsistent with the current reorganization provisions.
The continuity of interest requirements, as included in the definition of
207. See § 1273; Land, supra note 28, at 62.
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security instruments or the criteria of security instruments, is a misinter-
pretation of Pinellas.2 ' The continuity of interest requirement was in-
tended to be applied to stockholders to meet the requirements of a reor-
ganization.' 9 It is not clear that the continuity of interest doctrine was
ever intended to be applied to holders of security instruments to deter-
mine if the ownership interests qualified as security instruments.
There is a certain futility in requiring security holders to hold a con-
tinuing interest in a corporation because it is impossible to determine a
holder's motives for owning a debt instrument. Because debt instruments
are generally freely transferable and tradable, rarely will a holder actually
have a motive to maintain a continuing interest in a corporation. In addi-
tion, such a requirement is inconsistent with the current direction of the
continuity of interest doctrine based on the recent revisions to those pro-
visions.1
The continuity of interest requirement, as applied to stockholders, has
been narrowed in recent years. For example, the continuity of interest
doctrine no longer requires that stockholders retain their interests follow-
ing a reorganization. 1' Rather, the relevant period to test stockholders is
prior to, and immediately after, the transaction. As long as there was no
prearranged plan to sell shares prior to the reorganization, the stockhold-
ers are free to sell their shares immediately after the transaction without• 212
any effect on the continuity of interest requirement. Therefore, gener-
ally, as long as the stockholders exchange their target shares for acquiring
stock in the exchange, even if the stockholders choose to sell their stock
afterward, the transaction will not affect the reorganization from qualify-
ing as tax free.13
Because a stockholder may not hold the stock with the intention of
holding a long-term investment in the corporation, the reality is that the
individual motive of the stockholder is irrelevant. If the individual mo-
tives of stockholders are irrelevant to the continuity of interest require-
208. See Griswold, supra note 55, at 708-09.
209. Id. at 707-09.
210. In the legislative history to like-kind exchanges, the Senate Finance Committee
stated in 1924, "[t]he intention of the party at the time of the exchange [i.e., why they are
holding the property] is difficult to determine, is subject to change by him, and does not
represent a fair basis of determining tax liability." S. REP. No. 68-398, at 14 (1924).
Ironically, although holders of security instruments are currently held to this continuity
of interest requirement, the continuing interest of a security holder does not count toward
the continuity of interest requirement in the reorganization provisions. See Treas. Reg. §
1.368-1(e) (as amended in 2005); BITIKER & EUSTICE, supra note 43, 12.21[9].
211. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(7) ex. 3. The example assumes that there was not a
pre-arranged plan to sell off the target shares or acquiring shares immediately after the
reorganization. Id.
212. See § 1.368-1(e).
213. See § 1.368-1(e)(7) ex. 3.
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ment in reorganizations, the question then becomes why the intent of
debt holders is relevant to the continuity of interest test. By requiring
security holders to represent an enhanced degree of participation in the
corporation and to represent a continuing interest in the corporation be-
yond that of a debt holder, the continuity of interest doctrine, as applied
to security holders as created by case law, is more rigorous than the con-
tinuity of interest requirement as applied to stockholders under the reor-
214ganization provisions.
The requirement that holders of security instruments maintain a con-
tinuing interest in the corporation is inconsistent with the current conti-
nuity of interest requirements imposed on reorganizations, particularly
because stockholders are no longer required to maintain a continuing
interest after the reorganization.
Another example of how the continuity of interest requirement has
eroded and further diminished as applied to stockholders is that there is
no continuity of interest requirement in E and F reorganizations for
stockholders.21 The reasoning behind not requiring a continuity of inter-
est requirement in an E or F reorganization is that because of the very
nature of the type of reorganization, such a requirement for the stock-
holders is not necessary.216 If, however, debt instruments are exchanged
for debt instruments in a recapitalization qualifying as an E reorganiza-
tion, to qualify as security instruments and therefore for tax-free treat-
ment, the security instruments must represent a continuing interest in the
corporation, even though a continuity of interest requirement will not be
imposed on the equity holders in the corporation. Once again, the conti-
nuity of interest requirement is more rigorous to security holders than it
is to stockholders (or in this case as it is non-existent for stockholders). A
greater investment motive is required of holders of security instruments,
which represent a hybrid of debt and equity, than is required of stock,
which is pure equity.
There is no logical reason to require security holders to have a continu-
ing interest in the corporation, particularly when the same requirement is
not made of stockholders. The continuity of interest requirement as ap-
plied to security instruments is an arbitrary rule used to make the deter-
mination of whether debt instruments will constitute security instru-
ments. Because security instruments are debt, they cannot meet the
characteristics of equity as stock does. By the very nature of debt, the
holders of security instruments wish to be repaid whether the corporation
is in good or poor financial health. Holders of debt instruments do not
have a financial interest in the corporation beyond being paid on their
214. See Comm'r v. Freund, 98 F.2d 201,206-07 (3d Cir. 1938).
215. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b).
216. See Hickok v. Comm'r, 32 T.C. 80, 89 (1959).
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debt instruments. Alternatively, stockholders by their very nature have a
vested interest in seeing the corporation grow and succeed to maximize
their investment.
Requiring stockholders and holders of security instruments to have
similar motivations and interests in the corporation belies the very nature
of the underlying investments. Holders of security instruments hold debt,
not stock, and therefore, the reorganization requirement for continuity of
interest in the corporation should not apply to holders of security instru-
ments as though they hold a form of equity.
The correct test for security instruments is not whether holders have a
continuing interest in the corporation, but instead, whether the debt in-
strument represents an investment in the corporation, as opposed to a
loan to the corporation as a creditor. The determination must be
whether the security instrument represents debt instead of equity rather
than trying to create a hybrid category somewhere between debt or eq-
uity only for security instruments.217 If the holders have an investment in
the corporation which is more like stock or equity, then an exchange of
security instruments should be entitled to fully tax-free treatment, just
like stock. If, however, the investment that holders must have to be clas-
sified as security holders is more like debt, then an exchange of security
instruments should be fully taxable and subject to the debt modification
rules under section 1001-just like any other sale or exchange involving
debt instruments. Presumably all, if not most, security instruments fall
into the debt category rather than the equity category and therefore are
subject to sale or exchange analysis under section 1001.
The ideal solution would be to acknowledge that security holders do
not hold the same interest as stockholders and are not entitled to the
same preferences of equity ownership in a corporation. As a result, they
should not be treated as having, or be required to have, the same motiva-
tions and intentions as a stockholder. Rather, the reorganization provi-
sions should contemplate and acknowledge that security holders hold
debt instruments. Thus, the tax consequences of an exchange of debt
instruments in a reorganization should reflect the nature of their invest-
ment.
It is true that there is a difference between security instruments and
non-security instruments. In general, security instruments represent a
long-term interest in the corporation.218 Security holders have made a
longer commitment to the corporation than holders of short-term debt
instruments. This difference, however, is not sufficient to justify the dif-
217. The debt-versus-equity debate is challenging enough without the inclusion of an
unnecessary and unclear hybrid category in the middle. See generally BITrKER &
EUSTICE, supra note 43, 4.02; Polito, supra note 43, at 777-79.
218. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
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ference in the tax treatment between the two types of interests. The in-
terests are sufficiently alike 'that they should be taxed in the same man-
ner. Both are debt instruments, not equity interests. In either case, both
are creditors of the corporation with a higher priority than holders of
equity and a fixed return. Neither type of interest participates in the
growth of the company to a significant extent. While holders of security
instruments do have an enhanced participation in the corporation, it does
not rise to the level of the participation that equity holders have. Be-
cause the superior participation rights in the corporation are insufficient
to change the interest from debt to equity, they are -also insufficient to
justify taxing security interests differently than short-term debt. If the
participation rights were sufficient enough to justify the different tax
treatment, then the security instruments should be reclassified as equity.
Creating the third hybrid class of security instruments, which falls be-
tween debt and equity based on the elevated participation rights of secu-
rity holders, creates too much confusion and unnecessary complication.
In an attempt to simplify the tax system, taxpayers should be allowed
the luxury of being able to determine what they own, and to understand
the tax consequences that arise as a result of their ownership interest in
the corporation. Because of the current structure of the taxing regime as
applied to security instruments, often taxpayers cannot determine what
they own and therefore cannot properly ascertain their tax consequences.
If, however, Congress ultimately determines that there is still a need for
maintaining this middle hybrid category between debt and equity for se-
curity instruments, a bright line rule should be established. The current
system of evaluating certain factors and trying to pin down whether a
security instrument represents a continuing interest in the corporation
can often yield inconsistent and unfair results. A time-test can also often
come up with arbitrary results. For example, a debt instrument with a
term of nine years and ten months is not a security instrument, but a debt
instrument with a term of ten years is a debt instrument. A bright line
test, however, does give easy, clear rules, and such a mechanical determi-
nation should be applied to afford taxpayers the ability to determine
clearly what they own. To use prior case law as a basis, if a mechanical
time test were chosen, perhaps a ten-year test would be appropriate. 21 9 If
a debt instrument had a term of ten years or more, it would be considered
a security instrument; conversely, if it had a term of less than ten years, it
would not be a security instrument. This approach of allowing a middle
hybrid category would not, however, resolve the critical issue that non-
security debt holders often have better tax consequences than the tax
consequences afforded to security holders.
219. See generally supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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Non-security debt holders have more advantageous tax treatment thanS • 220
holders of security instruments in a reorganization. This is despite the
fact that holders of security instruments are held to an elevated owner-
ship interest, one that is a hybrid between debt and equity. The tax
treatment of holders of security instruments, however, is worse than the
tax treatment of both stockholders and holders of non-security debt in-
struments. In a tax-free reorganization, holders of security instruments
must still recognize any gain on the fair market value of the excess prin-
cipal amount of the security instrument that they receive in the ex-
change.221 Therefore, unlike the tax-free treatment afforded to stock-
holders in tax-free reorganizations, holders of security instruments must
still recognize gain on an exchange pursuant to a tax-free reorganization.
Holders of non-security debt instruments must also recognize any inher-
ent gain on an exchange in a tax-free reorganization 22 The amount of
gain that holders of non-security debt instruments must recognize is not
limited to the fair market value of the excess principal amount in the ex-
change as it is in the case of security instruments. Holders of non-security
debt instruments are taxed on the difference between their adjusted basis
in the debt instrument given up in the exchange and the issue price of the
debt instrument that they receive in the exchange.2 3 While in some cases
the holders of non-security debt instruments may recognize more gain
than holders of security instruments, this is not necessarily always the
case.
If, for example, the excess principal amount of the security instrument
exchanged is greater than the difference in fair market value, a taxpayer
would recognize more gain through a tax-free reorganization than
through a taxable exchange. If taxpayer C exchanges a security instru-
ment with an adjusted basis and principal amount of $1000 for a security
instrument with a principal amount of $1200 and a fair market value of
$1080, the security holder would recognize gain equal to the fair market
value of the excess principal amount or $180.224 If the exchange had been
fully taxable, the taxpayer would have only recognized $80 in gain.2z The
fair market value of a debt instrument might be less than the fair market
value of the excess principal amount if, for example, the term of the debt
instrument has been extended, or if the interest rate offered on the debt
instrument is below the current market rate being offered on similar debt
instruments.
220. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
221. See I.R.C. §§ 354(a)(1)-(2), 356(a), (d)(2)(B) (2006).
222. See §§ 61(a)(4), 1001(a); see also supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
223. See I.R.C. §§ 1001(a), 1273(a), 1274; Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(g) (as amended in
1996).
224. Treas. Reg. § 1.356-3(c) ex. 5 (as amended in 2000).
225. See I.R.C. § 1001(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-3 (as amended in 1996).
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Short-term debt holders have a more advantageous tax position than
the security holder, despite the fact that the security holder has more of
an equity-type investment in the corporation and is therefore included in
the tax-free reorganization provisions. Because most taxpayers would
like to take advantage of losses, holding non-security debt instruments is
a better choice for an investment than longer-term security instruments
because of the favorable tax consequences.
It should also be noted that while a holder of a security instrument
must recognize gain and cannot recognize loss on the exchange, in a tax-
free reorganization, it is entirely possible that the holder of a non-security
debt instrument will not have a taxable sale or exchange under section
1001.226 Because in connection with many tax-free reorganizations there
is no change in obligors-either because the same corporation is exchang-
ing its own debt instruments or because the new obligor is acquiring sub-
stantially all of the old obligor's assets-there will not be a significant
227modification, and therefore no sale or exchange. This would mean that
the holder of a non-security debt instrument would not have a sale or
exchange at all and would have similar, if not identical, tax consequences
to stockholders in the same tax-free reorganization.22' The security hold-
ers would, however, have taxable gain on the fair market value of any
excess principal amount, even if they did not receive anything of any
greater value. Once again, the most unfavorable tax consequences would
fall to the holders of security instruments.
By favoring non-security debt instruments, which are generally short-
term investments that do not represent a continuing interest in the corpo-
ration, the IRS is effectively discouraging investing in corporations
through long-term debt instruments. In addition, for corporations that
do have outstanding security instruments, restructuring these debt in-
struments is more difficult if the corporation tries to avoid the negative
tax consequences for the holders of security instruments. The tax conse-
quences awaiting holders of security instruments can also be a surprise to
those structuring or restructuring the capital structure of the corporation
because the transaction is characterized as tax free.
226. This is because a sale or exchange of a debt instrument requires a significant
modification. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-3(e).
227. See § 1.1001-3(e)(4)(C).
228. Again, this is assuming that, pursuant to the reorganization, the taxpayer is not
also exchanging stock or securities. If that were the case, all of the loss would be pre-
cluded. See I.R.C. § 356(c).
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B. The Tax Treatment of Security Instruments in Tax-Free Reorganiza-
tions Is Inconsistent with Public Policy
Congress enacted the reorganization provisions to avoid taxing transac-
tions that took place simply on paper.229 In the case of security instru-
ments, the Code now taxes a mere exchange of one security instrument
for another with the justification that the security holder is receiving
something of greater value for his interest. 2"' The taxpayer, however, is
precluded from recognizing a loss when he receives something of lesser
value."' By changing the rules to provide that an exchange of security
instruments is fully taxable, Congress would actually be encouraging
longer-term investment in corporations because the tax treatment would
be just as favorable as that applicable to non-security debt instruments.
In addition to discouraging investors from investing in long-term secu-
rity instruments (and encouraging investing in short-term notes instead),
the current tax provisions also encourage security holders to sell their
security instruments entirely rather than exchange them in a tax-free re-
organization. Because security holders cannot recognize losses and must
recognize gains, in a tax-free reorganization it is to security holders' ad-
vantage to sell their security instrument for cash rather than to exchange
it for a new security instrument, which could give rise to unfavorable tax
consequences."
This result runs contrary to the idea that by stimulating investment in
corporations, the Code will stimulate the economy. This system encour-
ages selling security instruments rather than exchanging them for new
security instruments and maintaining long-term investment in the corpo-
rate form. The tax treatment of holders of security instruments in tax-
free reorganizations also conflicts with the policy that taxpayers should
invest in long-term investments. This is contrary to the repeated com-
mitment by Congress to encourage long-term investments in corpora-
tions. It encourages consumption, or the buying and selling of investment
interests rather than investing for the long-term, because taxpayers are
better off either holding a shorter-term, non-security debt instrument or
selling off their security instrument should a tax-free reorganization arise,
than maintaining their current investment in the corporation.2 3' The pro-
229. See S. REP. No. 65-617, at 5 (1918).
230. See I.R.C. § 354(a)(1)-(2).
231. See § 354(a)(1).
232. See § 354(a)(1)-(2). This assumes that the new debt instrument would be for a
different face amount than the old debt instrument.
233. Fully taxing the exchange of security instruments in a tax-free reorganization is
inconsistent with a consumption tax. Proponents of the consumption tax would argue that
because the taxpayer has not cashed out his investment, there should not be any tax conse-
quences to the exchange of the security instruments because the taxpayer is maintaining
his investment. See generally William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow
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visions convert what would have been a purely paper transaction, which
Congress expressed a desire to avoid taxing, into a taxable transaction.
The tax treatment of security instruments otherwise conflicts with the
policy motivations behind the reorganization provisions. One of the jus-
tifications given for creating and keeping the reorganization provisions is
that there should be tax-free treatment until an investor cashes out his
interest.2 4 Because the taxpayer may not have cash available in an ex-
change of stock or security instruments until there is actually a cash sale,
taxing the gain prior to the cash sale would require investors to sell their
underlying interests to pay for the tax. In the case of security instru-
ments, security holders do not have any additional cash as a result of a
tax-free reorganization. Yet, holders of security instruments must pay tax
on any gain inherent in the exchange at the time of the exchange.23 ' This
differs from stockholders who may have inherent gain as the result of an
exchange in connection with a tax-free reorganization, but will not be
taxed on that gain until the stockholders cash out their investment be-
cause of the tax-free nature of the transaction. 36 By requiring that secu-
rity holders pay tax on the gain prior to receiving any cash proceeds from
their investment, holders of security instruments are in a position where
they may have to sell their security instruments to pay the tax on the in-
herent gain. Furthermore, because the tax treatment pursuant to a fully
taxable exchange is more beneficial to holders of security instruments,
they are better off simply selling their security instruments should a tax-
free reorganization arise rather than participating in the exchange.
C. Legislative History Dictates that the Tax Treatment of Security Instru-
ments in Reorganizations Should Be Changed
Congress had a dual motive in enacting both the reorganization provi-
sions and the rules relating to the taxation of security instruments in tax-
free reorganizations. Initially, Congress wanted to avoid taxing transac-
tions that were purely on paper-where the taxpayer never actually
cashed out his investment.237 Additionally, Congress wanted to maintain
Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1113, 1148-53 (1974). Even under a consumption
tax regime, however, the current tax treatment of an exchange of security instruments in a
tax-free reorganization is not correct. Rather, true tax-free treatment would be consistent
with the consumption tax. One could argue whether or not our current income tax system
should be restructured as a consumption tax instead. That, however, is beyond the scope
of this Article. What can be assured is that under our current tax system or even under a
consumption tax, the current taxation of an exchange of security instruments in a tax-free
reorganization is inconsistent and unfair to taxpayers, and it should be noted that the tax-
payer would benefit economically under either scenario.
234. See Brauner,supra note 92, at 53-56; see also S. REP. No. 67-275, at 11-12 (1921).
235. See § 354(a)(1)-(2).
236. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
237. See S. REP. No. 67-275, at 11-12.
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the reorganization provisions to ensure that taxpayers could not take
losses, particularly at a time when the United States economy and the
United States Treasury were hurting financially.
238
According to the legislative history, Congress thought the reorganiza-
tion provisions allowed the taxpayer to avoid recognizing gain on "paper
transactions" or where they had not yet actually converted their owner-
ship interests to cash. 2 9 The Senate stated that requiring taxpayers to
recognize gain severely interfered with necessary business adjustments. '
The Senate also stated that the reorganization provisions would consid-
erably "increase the revenue by preventing taxpayers from taking color-
able losses in wash sales and other fictitious exchanges." 24' Extensive
rules written and incorporated into the Code since that time have been
enacted and address the possibility that taxpayers could engage in ficti-
tious exchanges to trigger losses.242
It is not clear that the concern of Congress is legitimate-that making
an exchange of security instruments in a tax-free reorganization a fully
taxable event would allow taxpayers to take losses from fictitious ex-
changes. The economic conditions have changed since the days these
provisions were enacted. Taxpayers could orchestrate such fictitious ex-
changes under the current reorganization provisions if they wished. Al-
lowing taxpayers fully taxable treatment on an exchange of security in-
struments in a tax-free reorganization would not start a spate of fictitious
exchanges to trigger losses. In particular, it is stockholders, not security
holders, who have a vote in corporate affairs. In addition, with or with-
out the reorganization provisions, sales or exchanges can be deliberately
triggered by those choosing to manipulate the tax system. The question
being addressed is what happens to those long-term investors who do not
have any actual economic gain on an exchange of security instruments
and must now recognize gain but cannot recognize loss.
The House of Representatives stated that an attempt to prevent ficti-
tious exchanges was not a sufficient reason to justify the reorganization
provisions; although the reorganization provisions did make it more diffi-
cult to take losses, it did not make it impossible.24 Rather, a House sub-
committee created to investigate tax avoidance indicated that all that
would be required if someone were so inclined would be to simply re-
structure a transaction so that it did not fall into the reorganization provi-
238. See H.R. REP. No. 73-704, at 9-10 (1934).
239. See S. REP. No. 67-275, at 11-12; S. REP. No. 65-617, at 5-6 (1918).
240. See S. REP. No. 67-275, at 11.
241. Id. at 11-12.
242. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 267, 1091 (2006); see also Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 496-
98 (1940).
243. See H.R. REP. No. 73-704, at 13.
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sions.244 Again, it would be difficult for security holders to deliberately
structure such a transaction because they have no vote in the corporation.
It was in 1934, in the midst of the Great Depression, that the possibility
of removing the reorganization provisions from the Code was raised.245 It
was ultimately dismissed because many people had losses in their stock at
that time and the United States Treasury simply could not afford the loss
of tax revenues if taxpayers could recognize these losses.4 6 The Great
Depression is over, and tax simplification, consistency, and encourage-
ment of long-term investment in corporations must trump the fear of
triggering losses, particularly since the Code requires holders of security
instruments to recognize gain on the exchange of security instruments.
D. Solutions
There are two possible solutions to correct the inconsistent and unfair
tax treatment of security instruments in corporate reorganizations. The
first is that security instruments could be included with stock in the tax-
free treatment of tax-free reorganizations. The tax treatment of the secu-
rity instruments could mirror or parallel the tax treatment of stock. The
second, more preferable and consistent solution is to treat security in-
struments in the same manner that non-security debt holders are treated
for tax purposes.
1. Include Security Instruments in Tax-Free Reorganization Provisions
with the Same Tax Treatment Afforded to Stock
While including security instruments with stock in the tax-free reor-
ganization provisions would address some of the inconsistencies and in-
equities of the current tax treatment of holders of security instruments, it
would still raise several issues and problems. Allowing security holders
the same tax treatment as stock in tax-free reorganizations would, how-
ever, elevate the tax treatment of security holders above that of holders
244. SUBCOMM. OF THE H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 73RD CONG., PRELIMINARY
REPORT ON PREVENTION OF TAX AVOIDANCE 8-9 (H. Comm. Print 1933). The sub-
committee noted, "[i]f a taxpayer desires to take a loss, it is easy to arrange a transaction
falling without the [recognition of gain] exceptions." Id. at 39 (quoting a memorandum
from the staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation). Interestingly, the
Ways and Means Committee determined that under the current climate (the Great De-
pression), most reorganizations prevented losses from being recognized rather than avoid-
ing gains from being recognized; thus, the committee would not recommend removing the
reorganization provisions. See H.R. REP. No. 73-704, at 12-13. The current economic
climate is, however, not the same as it was in 1934, and if the provision is truly a revenue
raising provisions it is likely that the reorganization provision today results in gains not
being recognized rather than raising revenue by precluding losses.
245. See H.R. REP. No. 73-704, at 12.
246. See id. at 14.
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of non-security debt instruments, which would justify requiring security
instruments to have this hybrid-type interest between debt and equity.
47
Affording security instruments tax-free treatment in tax-free reorgani-
zations raises several issues. One problem this solution would not ad-
dress is that it is still difficult to define a security instrument under the
Code. This solution would not resolve this, and with the more favorable
tax treatment of pure tax-free treatment, it is possible that more corpora-
tions or taxpayers might try to design debt instruments to look like secu-
rity instruments to afford tax-free treatment while still retaining the ad-
vantages of a debt instrument. This could make the determination of
whether a debt instrument is a security instrument even more difficult
than it is currently because of the economic incentive that would sud-
denly be tied to classifying an interest as a security instrument.
A second problem is that security instruments are, in fact, debt instru-
ments, although they have some equity characteristics. They are not eq-
uity despite the attempts by Congress and the courts to apply equity-like
characteristics to them. Allowing holders of stock tax-free treatment and
allowing holders of security instruments modified tax-free treatment en-
courages investment in equity-like interests. By affording the same
treatment to security instruments, security holders could have all of the
tax benefits of holding an equity interest without the burdens and risks of
holding stock. Instead, they would have the greater sense of security that
is afforded to debt instruments.
The determination of whether an interest was debt or equity would be
not quite as critical if security instruments were afforded the same tax
treatment as stock because holders of both types of interests would ex-
pect the same type of beneficial tax consequences.
Ultimately, however, allowing security instruments to have the same
tax-free treatment that stock enjoys is not consistent with the policy mo-
tivations behind the reorganization provisions. Because security instru-
ments are, in fact, debt instruments, by allowing the same tax treatment
that is afforded to stock, the provisions would discourage stock owner-
247. This approach would be consistent with not only the current tax treatment of
stock in tax-free reorganizations but also with tax treatment in like-kind exchanges under
section 1031. See I.R.C. § 1031. Both provisions were originally enacted in the same pro-
vision, former section 202(c). See I.R.C. § 202(c) (1924). The policy reasons behind the
enactment were that until a taxpayer cashed out his investment, he should not pay tax on
the gain.
Ironically, in contrast to the current attempt by the courts and Congress to discover or
impute an intention on the part of holders of security instruments to maintain a continuing
interest in the corporation, in connection with like-kind exchanges, the Senate Finance
Committee found that a taxpayer's reason for holding the property did not serve as a
proper measure for assessing tax liability. See S. REP. No. 68-398, at 14 (1924). In 1921,
Congress amended the reorganization provision (former section 202(c)) to also include
like-kind exchanges. See S. REP. No. 67-275, at 11 (1921).
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ship. Debt is a more secure type of interest than stock because upon liq-
uidation of a corporation, debt holders are paid before equity holders.
24
Therefore, if both security holders and stockholders were entitled to the
same tax treatment, given a choice, an investor might opt for the security
instrument and enjoy more safety for his investment while also having the
more advantageous tax treatment.
The reorganization provisions were enacted to avoid taxing the conver-
sion of one type of equity interest to another, and to avoid taxing an in-
terest before it had ultimately been converted to cash.249 If the option of
affording security holders the same tax treatment was chosen, one would
have to hope that at the very least, Congress would adopt a consistent
and clear definition of a security instrument so that taxpayers could more
clearly understand what type of investment they own. Security instru-
ments are not equity and therefore should not be treated as such.
Rather, security instruments are debt, and in the goal of simplifying the
tax system, it would be ideal if the tax consequences of debt in a tax-free
reorganization could be predictable and relatively uncomplicated to de-
termine.
2. Tax Security Instruments as Non-Security Debt Instruments Are
Taxed
The second alternative is to treat holders of security instruments in tax-
free reorganizations in exactly the same manner that non-security debt
holders are treated. Rather than distinguishing between security instru-
ments and non-security debt instruments, all debt instruments would be
treated alike. Under this proposal, an exchange of security instruments
in a tax-free reorganization would be fully taxable subject to the sale or
exchange rules under section 1001. This might result in many holders of
security instruments recognizing more gain than they would have recog-
nized under the current rules, depending on the economic circumstances
of the exchange. It would, however, allow holders of security instruments
to recognize losses in the same manner that non-security debt holders are
able to recognize losses in a tax-free reorganization. Treating holders of
security instruments in the same manner as holders of non-security debt
instruments would also render irrelevant the mystery of whether a debt
instrument qualified as a security instrument. Not having to make the
determination of whether a debt instrument qualified as a security in-
strument would go a long way toward simplifying the reorganization pro-
visions.
248. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital
Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARv. L. REV. 874, 902
(2003).
249. See S. REP. No. 67-275, at 11-12.
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An exchange of security instruments in a tax-free reorganization would
be treated in the same manner as an exchange of security instruments in a
taxable exchange. If there is a significant modification of the security
instrument under section 1001, there will be a taxable exchange and the
security holder will have taxable gain or loss. If there is not a significant
modification of a debt instrument, the holder will not have taxable gain
or loss. As noted earlier, a merger or reorganization where Acquiring
Corporation acquired substantially all of the assets of Target Corporation
will not amount to a change in the obligor and will not, therefore, be a
significant modification.20 As a result, the reorganization or merger itself
will not cause a security holder to have taxable gain or loss. The security
holder will recognize gain or loss if what he receives in the exchange dif-
fers in economic value from what he originally owned. Taxable gain
would depend on whether the security holder was, in fact, richer than he
was before the reorganization. Once again, this tax treatment would
bring consistency and logic to the tax treatment of debt instruments un-
der the reorganization provisions. All debt instruments would be taxed
the same, without arbitrary distinctions governing or determining the tax
treatment.
This solution would also be consistent with the basic principles of debt
versus equity. Equity is not the same as debt, and maintaining an equity
interest in a corporation is consistent with continuity of interest treatment
where holders are maintaining their ownership interests in the corpora-
tion. Along with simplifying the reorganization provisions by dismissing
the necessity for the definition of security instruments and making the tax
treatment clearer, this approach would also clarify other issues relevant
to the tax treatment of security and debt instruments.
Rather than using the principal amount of the security instruments as
the measurement for gain, consistent with straight taxable exchanges of
debt instruments, the issue price of the debt instruments would be used.
This would alleviate a great deal of confusion for taxpayers on the
amount of their taxable gain, as well as confusion regarding items such as
OID, market discount, and bond premium.
The issue price of a debt instrument is a more accurate measurement of
the fair market value and the true economic value of what a security
holder is receiving versus giving up in the exchange. The principal
amount can often have no relation to the economic value of the security
instrument. Because items such as the term of the debt instrument, the
interest rate, the financial strength and security of the corporation, any
property securing the debt instrument, and many other items affect the
fair market value of a security instrument, the issue price will reflect ad-
justments in the fair market value for any of these items. Therefore, the
250. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-3(e)(4)(C) (as amended in 1996).
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issue price of the debt instrument will represent the true value of the debt
instrument.
VI. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF KEEPING THE CURRENT TAx
STRUCTURE
Proponents of keeping the current tax treatment of holders of security
instruments could argue that security holders are still in a more advanta-
geous tax position than regular debt holders. Security holders do not
have to recognize their total gain in a tax-free reorganization; rather, se-
curity holders must only recognize gain equal to the excess principal
amount of the debt instruments they receive.21 While it is true that secu-
rity holders on an exchange in a reorganization must recognize any gain
between the fair market value of the principal amounts of their debt in-
struments, because these numbers have no relation to the taxpayer's ad-
justed basis in the debt instruments, the taxpayer is still able to defer at
least some recognition of gain. For example, assume that a taxpayer paid
$60 for a debt instrument with a principal amount of $80 and an interest
rate of 6%. In an exchange pursuant to a tax-free reorganization, the
taxpayer exchanges the security instrument for a new security instrument
with a principal amount of $80, an interest rate of 4%, and a fair market
value of $80. The taxpayer would actually have $20 of economic gain, but
under the reorganization provisions as currently drafted, the taxpayer
would not have to recognize the additional realized gain of the difference
between the fair market value of what he received in the exchange less
his adjusted basis in the security instrument of $20 2 Alternatively, if the
two debt instruments were not securities, a holder of a non-security debt
instrument would have to recognize the full $20 of gain on the exchange.
An exchange like this example might occur if a corporation wanted to
recapitalize because of poor financial conditions in the corporation. If
the term on the debt instruments was coming due and the corporation
could not pay the debt instruments, the corporation might offer security
holders new security instruments with a greater fair market value in ex-
change for agreeing not to throw the corporation into bankruptcy.
In the example above, the taxpayer actually recognizes economic gain
but avoids paying tax on it because of the reorganization provisions. If,
however, as noted earlier, Congress was concerned about fictitious ex-
changes and colorable losses, then avoiding gain using these arbitrary
figures is inconsistent with that concern. Rather, a taxpayer should pay
tax on his true economic gain whether or not that ends up being less or
more than the fair market value of the excess principal amount. In addi-
251. See I.R.C. § 354(a)(2)(A).
252. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
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tion, because security holders cannot recognize loss, they are at a disad-
vantage when compared to non-security holders.
VII. CONCLUSION
Congress has repeatedly advocated for long-term investments in corpo-
rations over short-term investments. This position is illustrated by the
tax-free reorganization provisions and other tax provisions such as the
special long-term capital gains rate.53 Congress also has shown a prefer-
ence to equity ownership over debt ownership, which is illustrated by the
reorganization provisions and the reduced dividend tax rates among
other provisions. Some may argue that by allowing taxpayers to invest
their money in corporations and leaving it there as long as possible, it
stimulates economic growth and industry.
Unfortunately, however, the current tax treatment of holders of secu-
rity instruments conflicts with the public policy of encouraging long-term
investment. Debt holders are in a more favorable tax position if they
hold short-term non-security debt instruments rather than long-term se-
curity instruments in the case of tax-free reorganizations. In addition to
the fact that the tax treatment of short-term debt holders is often more
favorable, long-term security holders will also have better tax conse-
quences if, instead of participating in a tax-free reorganization, they sell
their debt instruments outright and divest themselves of an interest in the
corporation.
The reorganization provisions were originally enacted to avoid taxing
taxpayers on paper gains, to avoid interfering with normal business ad-
justments, and to avoid forcing taxpayers to recognize gain before they
had converted their ownership interests into cash. 4 Through modifica-
tions to the tax-free reorganization provisions, however, the tax treat-
ment of security instruments conflicts with these legislative policies and
directly conflicts with the legislative intent behind the provisions. Al-
though an exchange of security instruments will be a paper transaction,
security holders are taxed on gain and prevented from recognizing
losses. 5 By causing the tax treatment of security holders in a tax-free
reorganization to be unfavorable as compared to non-security debt hold-
ers in many scenarios, Congress is interfering with normal business ad-
justments. Business adjustments may be restructured to avoid these tax
implications to security holders; debt holders may opt to purchase short-
term investments rather than long-term investments to avoid the unfa-
vorable tax consequences altogether, or rather than participate in the
253. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.904(b)-l(c)(ii) (as amended in 2004).
254. See S. REP. No. 67-275, at 11-12 (1921); H.R. REP. No. 65-1037, at 44-45 (1919); S.
REP. No. 65-617, at 5-6 (1918).
255. See I.R.C. §§ 354(a)(2), 356(d)(2)(B).
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exchange at all, security holders may simply sell their security instrument
outright to guarantee more favorable tax treatment. Security holders are
also forced to pay tax on gain before they have ultimately converted their
interests to cash. In addition, the amount of taxable gain that security
holders are required to recognize does not accurately reflect their true
economic gain. Rather, it is entirely possible that a taxpayer may, in fact,
have an economic loss but because of the measurement of principal
amounts that the reorganization provisions use to determine gain, even
with an economic loss, the taxpayer may actually have to pay tax on a
gain.
The taxation of security instruments in tax-free reorganizations also
conflicts with current public policy. The provisions are unnecessarily
complicated. The provisions use amounts to measure gain, such as the
principal amount of the debt instrument, which are imprecise and do not
reflect a taxpayer's actual amount of economic gain."' In addition, be-
cause the principal amount is used, it does not correspond to the amounts
used to measure gain or loss in other contexts as well as a number of
other taxable items throughout the Code, such as OID, market discount,
and bond premium. These inconsistencies have been ignored despite the
call of many commentators to correct them and allow taxpayers some
degree of clarification and simplification in determining their tax liabili-
ties.57
Additionally, the issue of the tax treatment of security instruments is
further clouded because the definition of what constitutes a security in-
strument is unclear. Taxpayers must struggle with determining what they
own before they can even move on to determining the tax consequences.
By removing the distinction between a security instrument and a non-
security debt instrument in the tax-free reorganization context, Congress
could significantly simplify the reorganization provisions.
An exchange of security instruments should be fully taxable in the
same manner as any other exchange of debt instruments in a tax-free
reorganization. The distinction between the tax treatment of ownership
interests in tax-free reorganizations should not be made between equity,
debt, and the hybrid ownership interest of security instruments; rather, it
should be simplified to distinguish solely between equity and debt.
Stockholders, and holders of other equity interests, should be entitled to
tax-free treatment under the reorganization provisions. As holders of
equity, stockholders manifest an ownership interest and a continuing
proprietary interest in the corporation. The application of the continuity
of interest doctrine to security holders is misplaced. Holders of security
256. See §§ 354(a)(2), 356(d)(2)(B).
257. See Reich, Schwartz & Rievman, supra note 194; Schler, supra note 194; see also
Lee, supra note 194.
[Vol. 56:99
Inconsistent Tax Treatment
instruments should be subject to the sale or exchange rules under section
1001 in the context of a tax-free reorganization, just as all other debt in-
struments are subject. As debt holders, security holders cannot appro-
priately maintain a continuing proprietary interest in the corporation.
Trying to force security holders into a category by requiring a continuing
interest simply causes inconsistent and inappropriate results.
Finally, because the reorganization provisions prevent the recognition
of loss, after Revenue Ruling 2004-78, many debt holders will be forced
to recognize gain and will be prevented from recognizing loss in a tax-free
reorganization. Revenue Ruling 2004-78 expands the definition of secu-
rity instruments so significantly that it essentially changes the reorganiza-
tion provisions by requiring that only one of the debt instruments in an
exchange must constitute a security instrument.218 As long as the terms of
the two exchanged debt instruments match closely enough, if one of the
debt instruments constitutes a security instrument, then the other debt
instrument will constitute a security instrument, even if it could not have
constituted a security instrument independently. This is a dangerous
movement that will subject more and more debt instruments to the ineq-
uitable and inconsistent tax treatment highlighted in this Article.
258. See Rev. Rul. 2004-78, 2004-31 I.R.B. 108, 109.
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